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INTRODUCTION
For decades, international legal scholarship has been mired in an ontological
debate regarding its own existence and relevance. 1 This self-doubt can b- traced
to the intellectual movement which developed following World War II that chal-
lenged the relevance of international law.2 Scholars such as George Kennan and
Hans Morgenthau strongly criticized the perception that international law could
* Ph.D Student, Department of Government, Harvard University, MA., Harvard
University, Ford Foundation Fellow and Lecturer, UCLA School of Law, 1994-1996;
J.D.MA., University of Southern California Law Center.
1. See, e.g., Alfred P. Rubin, Enforcing the Rules of International Lz'v 34 HARV.
TNT'L L. 3. 149 (1993); Mark W. Janis, International Law? 32 HARV. Ih 'L L. J. 363
(1991); Phillip R. Trimble, International Lm, World Order and Critical Legal Studies, 42
STAN. L. REv. 811, 833-34 (1990) (book review); FRANCiS BoYL Valun PoLmcs AND
nmhu-ATIOxAL LAW 3-16 (1985); Anthony D'Anato, Is International LawReally Lav? 79
N.W. U. L. REv. 1293 (1984); Ian Brovmlie, The Reality and El cacy of International
Law, 52 Bnrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1981); Louis HENMN, How NATIos BEHAvE 12-27 (2nd
ed. 1979); Richard Falk, The Adequacy of Contemporary Theories of International Lma-
Gaps in Legal Thinking, 50 VA. L. REV. 231 (1964); J.L. BRIPLY, Tim Law OF NATIONS:
ANINTRODUCTION TO THE INTaERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 49-56 (Humphrey Waldock ed. 6th
ed. 1963); Roger Fisher, Bringing Law to Bear on Governments, 74 HAv. L. Rnv. 1130
(1961); H.L.A. HART, Tim CoNcEPT OF LAW 208-31 (1961); Glanville Williams, Interna-
tional Law and the Controversy Concerning the Word "Law", 22 BRIT. Y.B. IhT'L L. 146
(1945).
2. ARNcoLD WoLFERS, DiscoRD AND COLLABORATION (1962); RorRT STAuSZ-Huta,
PowER AND Conrn-nY (1956); JOHN AusTiN, THE PROVInCE OF JuRispRuDENCE
DaT Ei ED 133, 201 (1954); Reinhold Niebuhr, The Rlusion of World Government, 5
BuLL. ATOM. ScL 290 (Oct 1949). More recent criticisms of the relevance of international
law have also been made. See, e.g., Charles Krauthamner, The U.N. Obsession, TD.i,
May 9, 1994, at 86; Robert Bork, The Limits of 'International Lmp,' NATIoiALIT hERS 3
(Winter 1989190); Charles Krauthamner, The Curse of Legalism, NEw REPuBLc, Nov. 6,
1989, at44; Irving Kristol, International Law and International Lies, W.AL ST. J., June 21,
1985, at 26.
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effectively regulate international behavior.3 This intellectual movement, which
attacked the efficacy of such international institutions as the United Nations, in-
fluenced a generation of legal scholars to question the relevance of international
law.
4
In response, international legal scholarship sought to infuse its work with a
new sense of purpose. From the policy science approach of Myres McDougal and
Harold Lasswell to the legal process work of Abram Chayes and Louis Henkin,
these new efforts emphasized the practical implications of international law. 5 For
example, the McDougal-Lasswell approach viewed international law as a political
process. 6 From their perspective, "law emanates from the unending clashes or
3. GEORGE F. KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1900-1951 (1951) (condemning the
legalistic-moralistic approach to international problems). This approach is based on the
belief that "it should be possible to suppress the chaotic and dangerous aspirations of gov-
ernments in the international field by the acceptance of some system of legal rules and re-
straints." Id. at 95. According to Kerman, the "legalistic approach to international affairs
ignores in general the international significance of political problems and the deeper
sources of international instability." Id. at 99. See also HANs MORGENTHAU, PoLmcs
AMoNGNATIONS 312 (6th ed. 1985) (criticizing international law, arguing "[tjhat there can
be no more primitive and no weaker system of law enforcement than this; for it delivers
the enforcement of the law to the vicissitudes of the distribution of power between the
violator of the law and the victim of the violation.").
4. The term "relevance of international law" was used as the title of a book of essays
honoring Leo Gross. See TiE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (Karl Wolfgang
Deutsch & Stanley Hoffmann eds., 1971) (asserting the notion that international law is
"relevant to the affairs of the world," and that it is not isolated from international politics).
Additionally, the introduction states that "law rests upon political foundations, without
which law could neither endure nor contribute anything to the improvement of society."
Id. World politics, however, cannot exist without laws. Furthermore,
Where law has been broken, it must be rebuilt; where it is missing, it must be developed. Where it
exists it must be preserved with a measure of autonomy of its own, so as to serve as a guide and re-
straint for power, rather than as an excuse of it.
Id. at 1-2. Despite the tone of the title and the introduction, several essays actually raised
significant questions about the ability of international law to effectively regulate state be-
havior.
5. See Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations
Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205, 207-20 (1993) (reviewing post-World
War I development of international legal scholarship) (author Anne-Marie Slaughter Bur-
ley will hereinafter be referred to as "Slaughter"); David Kennedy, A New Stream ofInter-
national Law Scholarship, 7 Wis. INT'L L. J. 1 (1988).
6. See generally MYREs S. McDOUGAL & W. MICHAEL REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN CoNTEMPoRARY PERSPECTIVE: THE PUBLIC ORDER OF TIE WORLD COMMUNITY (1981);
TowARD WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MYRas S. McDouoAL
(W. Michael Reisman & Bums H. Weston eds., 1976); MYREs S. McDouoAL &
FLoRENnINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1961); MYREs S.
McDouGAL & Assoc., STUDIEs IN WORM PUBLIC ORDER (1960); Myres S. McDougal, In-
ternational Law, Power and Policy: A Contemporary Conception, 82 RECuEiL DEs CoURS
137 (1953 1). See also Gray Dorsey, The McDougal-Lasswell Proposal to Build a World
Public Order, 82 AM. J. INT'LL. 41 (1988).
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confrontations between claims and counterclaims concerning the distribution of
values which constitute a central feature of all social systems." 7 Their work em-
phasized the role of international lawyers as vehicles for the promotion of public
order. In contrast, Chayes and Henkin viewed international law as a legal proc-
ess.8 Their work emphasized the functional applications and implications of in-
ternational law.9
Recently, scholars have sought to develop an alternative approach to affirm the
relevance of international law. Scholars such as Kenneth Abbott, Edwin Smith,
John Setear, and Anne-Marie Slaughter have promoted an interdisciplinary ap-
proach to the study of international affairs.10 Their scholarship is founded in
theories of international relations, which seek to provide causal explanations of
international phenomenon. Specifically, these theories seek to provide a system-
atic study of international affairs and to discover the principal variables that influ-
ence state behavior. For example, institutionalist theory posits that international
institutions play an important role in promoting cooperation among states.
11 In-
stitutionalist theory has been used to examine such diverse issues as the develop-
ment of the European Union, economic sanctions during the Falkland Islands
conflict, and the promotion of international environmental accords.12
The application of institutionalist theory by legal scholars seems quite natural.
Thus, Kenneth Abbott, John Setear and Edwin Smith have applied elements of
institutionalist theory to examine international trade law, arms control agreements
and the law of treaties.
13
7. Oran Young, International Law and Social Science: The Contributions of Ayres
McDougal, 66 AM. J. I.r'LL. 60, 61-62 (1972).
8. See generally AimAm CHAYES, THE CUBAN MissILE CRISIS (1974); HErI n, supra
note 1, passim. See also DANmL G. PARTAN, THm INiwqATIONAL Laxi PRCESS (1992);
ABRAM CHAYEs ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESs: MATERIALS FOR Al INTRODUCTORY
COURSE (1968-1969).
9. CHAYEs, supra note 8, at xii. ("How--and how far-do law, lavers, and legal
institutions operate to affect the course of international affairsT").
10. Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for
International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335 (1989); John K. Setear, An Iterative Per-
spective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and International La1,
37 HAR V. INT'LL. J. 139 (1996); Edwin M. Smith, Understanding Dynamic Obligations:
Arms ControlAgreements, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1549 (1991).
11. Robert 0. Keohane, International Institutions: Two Approaches, 32 INT'L STUD.
Q. 379, 386 (1988) (defining institutions as 'persistent and connected sets of rules (formal
and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape e pectations").
12. See, e.g., MmEs KARLER, I nTER oNAL INsTrTMoNs Al'm Tim PoLTIcAL
EcoNoMY OF INTEGRATION (1995); LISA MARTIN, CoERcIvE COOPERATIO=: F LAIN1nG
MuLTILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS (1992); INsTioxNs FOR nM EARTI SOURCES OF
EFFEcnivE iIRNATIONAL ENVIRONMNTAL PROTECTION (Peter Haas et al, eds., 1993).
13. See, e.g., Setear, supra note 10, passim; Kenneth Abbott, "Trust But Verify". The
Production of Information in Arms Control Treaties and Other International Agreements,
26 COREL INT'L L. J. 1 (1993); Smith, supra note 10, passim; Kenneth W. Abbott, The
Trading Nation's Dilemma: The Functions of the Law of International Trade, 26 HAv.
1997]
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
This article seeks to contribute to this interdisciplinary research agenda. The
works of Abbott, Setear and Smith are significant because they describe the bene-
fits of incorporating institutionalist theory in international legal analysis. 14 hI
contrast to earlier efforts, however, this article provides a broader analysis of in-
stitutionalist theory. It does not focus on one element of institutionalist theory;
rather, it examines each element of institutionalist theory, describing the diverse
mechanisms through which institutions promote cooperation. This piece then ex-
amines international law from the perspective of institutionalist theory.
This article is divided into four sections. Section I provides the intellectual
foundation of this article and argues why students of international law should de-
velop a theoretical approach to the study of international cooperation. This article
suggests that theories of international relations can provide a useful framework
for the analysis of international legal issues. Section II examines a prominent the-
ory of international relations-institutionalist theory. It first reviews the underly-
ing assumptions of institutionalist theory and then describes the diverse mecha-
nisms through which institutions promote cooperation. Section III applies
institutionalist theory to examine the two principal sources of international law:
treaty law and customary international law. It recognizes that both sources of in-
ternational law contain mechanisms identified by institutionalist theory that pro-
mote cooperation. Both treaty law and customary international law influence state
behavior by minimizing uncertainty, promoting efficiency and reducing rent-
seeking behavior by egoistic states. Finally, Section IV examines the recently con-
cluded Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty i5 from an institutionalist perspective.
In the spirit of interdisciplinary research, this article is beneficial to students of
both international law and international relations. This work may be used by stu-
dents of international law seeking to understand institutionalist theory and its ap-
plication to international legal scholarship. Furthermore, this paper is useful for
students of international relations seeking to understand international law and its
application to the study of international relations.
INT'L L. J. 501 (1985). In contrast, the work of Anne-Marie Slaughter emphasizes an al-
ternative theoretical approach to the study of international affairs-liberalism. Slaughter,
supra note 5, at 226-38. See also Anne-Marie Slaughter, Liberal International Relations
Theory and International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 717 (1995);
AND W MoPAvCsiK, LBERALISM AND InENATioNAL RELATONS THEORY (Center for In-
ternational Affairs Working Paper, Harvard University, 1992).
14. In addition to these legal scholars, some political scientists have also recognized
the benefits of interdisciplinary research. See, e.g., Duncan Snidal, Political Economy and
International Institutions, 16 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 121 (1996); Robert 0. Keohane,
Compliance with International Commitments: Politics Within a Framework of Law, 86
AM. Soc. INT'L L. PRoc. 176 (1992); Oran Young, Remarks, 86 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PRoc.
172 (1992); Christopher Joyner, Crossing the Great Divide: Views of a Political Scientist
Wandering in the World of International Law, 81 AM. Soc. INT'LL. Poc. 385 (1987).
15. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Sept. 24, 1996, U.N. Doc. A/50/1027, Annex, 35




Why should students of international law be interested in theories of interna-
tional relations? Interdisciplinary research is by no means a simple task. It re-
quires mastery of two complex disciplines, with all the attendant intellectual bag-
gage and jargon that accompany these fields. If students are going to undertake
the arduous journey of interdisciplinary research, they should be assured before-
hand that the trip is worth taking.
A. THE NEED FOR THEORY
To answer this question, it is first necessary to understand the purpose of the-
ory. 16 A theory seeks to provide causal explanations of observable phenomenon
and to provide a basis for predicting future behavior.17 In the absence of theory,
the student can only describe observable phenomenon in an ad hoc manner.
While interesting, these observations cannot provide a framework to guide subse-
quent analysis. If students seek to move beyond mere observation, to develop
causal explanations, and to generate testable hypotheses, they must begin with
theory. Indeed, theory provides the intellectual foundation for all scientific re-
search.
The development of theory can be divided into four stages: metaphor, analogy,
model and theory.' 8 Each stage represents an increasing level of specification.
The metaphor involves the least rigorous method of analysis.19 The next stage of
specification is the analogy.20 The main difference between analogy and metaphor
is that analogy requires a tighter specification of correspondences between prop-
erties and a closer evaluation of conclusions. 21 The third stage of specification is
the model.22 Here the major distinguishing characteristic is a formal logic that is
16 See JANi s N. RosENAu, Tim Scmunrc STUDY OF FOREIGN PouYc 19-31 (1980)
(discussing the benefits of thinking about theory).
17. IAsns DOUGHERTY & ROBERT PFALTzGRAFF, JR., CoNTENDiG THEo' Es c7
INTrERNATIONAL RELATIONS, A COMRMENSIVE STUDY 16-17 (3d. ed. 1990) (stating that a
theory is "an intellectual tool that helps us to organize our knowledge, to ask significant
questions, and to guide the formulation of priorities in research as well as the selection of
methods to carry out research in a fruitful manner.").
18. Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics, 38 Vlo. . PoL. 25,
29-36 (1985). Similarly, Max Black once observed that "perhaps every science must start
with metaphor and end with algebra; and perhaps without the metaphor there vould never
have been any algebra." MAXBLACK, MODELS AiN METAPHORS 242 (1962).
19. Snidal, supra note 18, at 29 (asserting "[n]o formal deductive apparatus is in-
volved. an implied comparison of two entities is used to infer further properties or conclu-
sions from one to the other.").
20. Id. at 31.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 33.
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both deductive and internal. 23 The final stage of specification is the theory.
24
Theory contains a deductive structure in addition to interpretation of both funda-
mental assumptions and theoretical constructs. 25 A good theory requires satisfac-
tion of the following two requirements: (1) the theory must use a model, contain-
ing few arbitrary elements, to accurately describe a large class of observations;
and (2) the theory must make concise predictions regarding the results of future
observations.
26
The use of theory in the pursuit of knowledge is most closely associated with
the natural sciences. From Galileo to Copernicus, Newton to Einstein, the process
of scientific inquiry has been guided by the intellectual rigor and logic of the theo-
retical approach.27 It is through this process that we have come to better under-
stand our world and its place in the universe. The rigor and logic of the theoreti-
cal approach are not limited to the natural sciences, however, they are also found
in the social sciences. 28 For example, political science, economics, sociology and
anthropology are each concerned with understanding particular events as well as
generalizing about social phenomenon.29 Thus, the use of theory and the scien-
tific method are prominent in these disciplines. It is not surprising, therefore, that
23. Id. at 32-34 (contrasting the inductive and external logic of analogy).
24. Id. at 34.
25. Id. (adding that "[t]his richer interpretive structure (as compared to the tighter cor-
respondences in the model) provides for greater richness of explanation. Through it, the
theory maintains a greater open-endedness and a surplus meaning which guides revision
and extension of the model.").
26. STEnHENW. HAWKNG, A BRIEFI-hSTORY OTnvm 9(1988).
27. See THEoRIms OF EXPLANATION (Joseph C. Pitt ed., 1988); STEPHEN TOULMIN,
FOREsIGHT AND UNDERSTANDING: AN INQUIRY INTO THE AIMS OF SCIENCE (196 1); GUSTAV
BERGMANN, PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE (1957); CARL HEMeEL, FuNDAMENTALs OF CONCEPT
FORMATION IN EMPIRICAL SCIENCE (1952).
28. See KENNETH BORDENS & BRUCE ABBOTT, RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS: A
PROCESS APPROACH 495-526 (2d ed. 1991); CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE
(Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave eds., 1970); WESLEY GOULD & MICHAEL BARKuN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1970); ALAN C. ISAAK, SCOPE AND
METHODS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE METHODOLOGY OF POLITICAL
INQUIRY (1975); RICHARD S. RUDNER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE (1966). But see
G.H. WRIGHT, EXPLANATION AND UNDERSTANDING (1971); PETR WINCH, THE IDEA OF A
SOCIAL SCIENCE AND ITS RELATION To PHImosoPHY (1973). See also John Ferejohn, Struc-
ture and Ideology: Change in Parliament in Early Stuart England, in IDEAS AND FOREIGN
POLICY: BELIEFS, INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL CHANGE 207, 228 (Judith Goldstein & Rob-
ert 0. Keohane eds., 1993) (explaining that the goal of social science theories is to provide
causal explanations of events in the same manner that scientific theories provide explana-
tions of physical or biological phenomena). The author further states that social science
theories are intended to provide a reasoning for certain social actions. Id. These theories
seek to answer not only the questions of cause but to provide reasons why people act the
way they do. Id.
29. See J. Donald Moon, The Logic of Political Inquiry: A Synthesis of Opposed Per-




the use of theory is also prominent in the study of law.30 Indeed, the use of theory
is particularly relevant to those scholars seeking to understand the role of law in
society.
3 1
In sum, theories are necessary to understand, explain and predict social phe-
nomenon. In their absence, all efforts at analysis are nothing more than random
guessing.
B. THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
In many respects, the study of international relations is an ancient discipline.
Efforts to explain international behavior can be found in the work of Thucydides
and his account of the Peloponnesian War.32 Indeed, Thucydides was perhaps the
first scholar to specifically examine the causes of war and his conclusions remain
equally valid today: "[tihe growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which
this inspired in Lacedaemon, made war inevitable." 33 Similar efforts to describe
international behavior can be found in the work of Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau
and Kant.3 4 Hobbes, for example, noted that in the absence of a common power,
or Leviathan, men live in a constant state of war.35 This description of domestic
society was also applicable to international society, where sovereign nations "be-
cause of their Independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and pos-
ture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one an-
other."36 Kant also recognized the conflictual nature of international society.
37
Even if nations were not involved in active hostilities, there was always a constant
threat of war. "Thus the state of peace must be formally instituted, for a suspen-
sion of hostilities is not in itself a guarantee of peace." 38 Kant's solution was to
identify a series of normative and procedural rules to govern nations in their in-
30. See, e.g., Edvrard L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evahating Legal
Scholarship, 80 CAL. L. REv. 889 (1992); David L. Faiginan, To Have and Have Not: As-
sessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 F_MolY L.J. 1005
(1989); John Veilleux, Note, The Scientific Model in La, 75 Gso. L.J. 1967 (1987).
31. See KENNmHN. WALTZ, TEOaY OFINERNTIONAL PoLITCS 6-7 (1979).
32. THucyDmEs, THE PEOPONESIAN WAR: Ti CRAwLEY TRANsLAT oi REVisEM
(T.E. Wick ed., Modem Library 1982). See also Laurie Johnson Bagby, The Use and
Abuse of Thucydides in International Relations, 48 ITh. ORG. 131 (1994).
33. THucyDIDEs, supra note 32, at 14.
34. IlUim KANT, KANr. POLmCAL WUrTMGS (Hans Reiss ed., 2d ed. Cambridge
University Press 1991); JEAN-JACQUES RousSEAu, THE BASic PoLMcAL Whrr s (Doland
Cress trans. & ed., 1987); THOmAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin
1968); NIccoLo MAcmAvE.w, THE PR=NsE: A NEW TRANSLATIO, BAc Rom_,ms,
NTRPRETATIONS (Robert M. Adams ed., 2d ed. Norton 1992) (1513).
35. HOBBES, supra note 34, at 185-188. See also Michael Williams, Hobbes and In-
ternationalRelations: A Reconsideration, 50 INT. ORG. 213 (1996).
36. HOBBES, supra note 34, at 187.
37. KANT, supra note 34, at 98.
38. Id.
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temal affairs as well as in their relations with each other.39
As a formal science, however, the study of international relations is relatively
new.40 Indeed, it was not until 1939 that the English scholar E.H. Carr first re-
ferred to the science of international politics.4 1 Carr viewed the study of interna-
tional politics as a purposive enterprise, designed to investigate the causes of war
and the conditions for peace. This new science would examine world politics, not
as it should be, but as it actually was. As the study of international relations de-
veloped, so to did efforts to create a more rigorous science. These efforts empha-
sized the development of theoretical models to examine international affairs.
42
Despite the diversity of thought present in these theoretical approaches, each of
these efforts share a common goal-to make the actions of states understandable
and to provide a framework in which they can be intelligently described.
43
At present, the study of international relations encompasses a wide variety of
distinct theoretical approaches. 44 For example, there is now a strong emphasis on
39. Id. at 93-108. See also Fernando R. Teson, The Kantian Theory of International
Law, 92 CoLUM. L. REv. 53 (1992); Michael A. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and For-
eign Affairs, 12 PHILOS. & PUBL. AF. 205 (1983).
40. See Raymond Aron, What is a Theory of International Relations? 21 J. INT. AFF.
190 (1967); Hedley Bull, International Relations Theory: The Case for a Classical Ap-
proach, 28 WORLD POL. 361 (1966); Morton Kaplan, Is International Relations a Disci-
pline? 23 J. POL. 463 (1961); CONTEMPORARY THEORY IN INTEATIONAL RELATIONS 4-6
(Stanley Hoffmann ed., 1960); QUINCy WRGHT, Tim STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
23-28 (1955).
41. EDWARD HALLETT CARR, TnE TWENTY YEARs' CRIsIs 1919-1939: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INrERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1-2 (2d ed. 1964).
42. Id. See Jack Levy, The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence, in
BEAvI oR, SOCIETY & NucLEAR WAR 209 (Philip Tetlock et al., eds., 1989) (providing dif-
ferent theoretical approaches to the study of international relations); Stanley Hoffmann, An
American Social Science: International Relations, in STANLEY HoFmANN, JANUS &
MNERVA: ESSAYS IN TE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL POLmCS 3 (1987); PAUL
R. VIoT-n & MARK V. KAUPPI, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: REALISM, PLURALISM,
GLOBALISM (1987); INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY: A READER Th
INTERNATIONAL THEORY (James N. Rosenau ed., 1969).
43. Robert 0. Keohane, Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond, in
POLrICAL ScrENcE: THE STATE OF =H DiscnLnm 503, 505-06 (Ada W. Finifier ed., 1983).
44. Despite these efforts, it is important to recognize the inherent limitations of the
scientific method in the study of international behavior. According to Robert Keohane:
Deterministic laws elude us, since we are studying the purposive behavior of relatively small numbers
of actors engaged in strategic bargaining. In situations involving strategic bargaining, even formal
theories, with highly restrictive assumptions, fail to specify which of many possible equilibrium out-
comes will emerge. This suggests that no general theory of international politics may be feasible. It
makes sense to seek to develop cumulative verifiable knowledge, but we must understand that we can
aspire only to formulate conditional, context-specific generalizations rather than to discover universal
laws, and that our understanding of world politics will always be incomplete.
Keohane, supra note 14, at 379-80. See also John Lewis Gaddis, International Relations
Theory and the End of the Cold War, 17 INT'L SEC. 5, 25-29 (Winter 1992/93); John Free-
man & Brian Job, Scientific Forecasts in International Relations: Problems of Definition
[VOL. 12:2
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economic theory and other rationalistic approaches which view the state as an
egoistic actor seeking to maximize its own interests.45 The prominence of this
movement has led to the regular use of game theory and the microeconomic the-
ory of the firm in the analysis of international relations. The emphasis on ration-
alistic theories, however, has not diminished the importance of the reflectivist ap-
proach.46 The reflectivist approach recognizes the relevance of ideas and learning
in the analysis of international relations.47 The study of international relations has
also become more formalized in its efforts to promote careful empirical research.
Indeed, recent scholarship has sought to emphasize the importance of designing
rigorous scientific research.
48
Students of law and international relations share much in common. Both disci-
plines examine order in international affairs and seek to design mechanisms that
facilitate cooperation in an anarchic world. Therefore, "[i]f social science has any
validity at all, the postulates developed by political scientists concerning patterns
and regularities in state behavior must afford a foundation and framework for le-
gal efforts to regulate that behavior."
4 9
II. INSTITUTIONALIST THEORY
One of the most prominent theories of international relations is institutional-
and Epistemology, 23 INT'L STUD. Q. 117 (1979); FoRECASTo IN ItrlERrnATio-L
RELAIONS: THEORY, METHODS, PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS (Nazli Choucri & Thomas Robinson
eds., 1978); Ronald Rogowski, Rationalist Theories of Politics: A Midterm Report, 30
WoRLD POL. 296 (1978); Gabriel Almond & Stephen Geaco, Clouds, Clocks, and 'the
Study ofPolitics, 29 WORDPoL. 489 (July 1977).
45. See JAiMS MoRRow, GAm THEORY FoR PoLmcAL ScrS (1994); ROBERT O.
KEoHAim, AFm HEGEMONY. CooPERATiON AND DiscoRD IN THE WORLD PoLrncAL
EcoNoMY 27-29, 65-84 (1984); WALTZ, supra note 31, at 89-93; EcoNoMIC TmEo.s OF
ihNmuArioNAL PoLrIcs (Bruce Russett ed., 1968); THomAs SCmHEL o, THE STRATEGY OF
CONFLICt (1960).
46. Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of
Power Politics, 46 INT'L ORG. 391 (Spring 1992); Thomas Biersteker, Critical Reflections
on Post-Positivism in International Relations, 33 INT'L STUD. Q. 263 (1989).
47. Keohane, supra note 11, at389-93.
48. See GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SociAL INQUIRY: SCIENrFc IFERENcE IN
QUALiATnVEsEARCH (1994); Symposium, The Qualitative-Quantitative Disputation, 89
AM. POL. SCL REv. 454 (1995); DouGmERTY & PFALzGRA1'F, supra note 17, at 41.
To sum up, the essential function of international theory is to enable us to improve our kmovled.e
concerning international reality, whether for the sake of "pure undertanding" or for the more active
purpose ofchangingthat reality. Theory helps us to order our existing knowledge and to discover
new knowledge mor efficiently. It provides a framework ofthought in wAch we define reearch pri.
orities and select the most appropriate available tools for the gathering and analysis of data. Theory
directs our attention to significant similarities and differences, and suggests relationzbip3 not prtmi-
ously perceived. At its best, theory serves as a proof that the powers ofthe human mind have been
appliedto a problem at hand with prevision, imagination, and profimdity, and this proof impir-s oth.
ers to further efforts for purposes either of agrecing or disagreeing,
Id.
49. Slaughter, supra note 5, at 205.
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ism. While it recognizes the anarchic nature of the international system, it sug-
gests that institutions can improve the likelihood of cooperation.
A. ANARCHY AND THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Most studies of international relations characterize the international system as
anarchic in nature, in which there is no common government or formal govern-
ance structure among states.50 Because no central authority acts to monitor state
behavior or enforce obligations, states must protect their own interests. 5 1 As noted
by Hans Morgenthau, "[i]t is an essential characteristic of international society,
composed of sovereign states, which by definition are the supreme legal authori-
ties within their respective territories, that no such central lawgiving and law-
enforcing authority can exist there."52 The consequences of anarchy are signifi-
cant. At a minimum, states in anarchy are concerned about power and security.
53
In this environment, competition is endemic and states often fail to cooperate even
in the face of common interests. 5
4
50. David Baldwin, Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics, in NEOREALISM
AND NEOLIBERALISM: TBE CoNTEh PORARY DEBATE 4 (David Baldwin ed., 1993). See also
Helen Milner, The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory, 17 Rv.
INT'L STwU. 67 (1991).
51. In his classic work on governance, Machiavelli recognized that the prince is solely
motivated by self-interest. "Thus a prudent prince cannot and should not keep his word
when to do so would go against his interest, or when the reasons that made him pledge it
no longer apply. Doubtless if all men were good, this rule would be bad; but since they are
a sad lot, and keep no faith with you, you in your turn are under no obligation to keep it
with them." MACHIAVELLI, supra note 34, at 48.
52. MORGENTmU, supra note 3, at 296. According to Waltz:
[The sovereignty of the state also means that] it decides for itself how it will cope with its internal and
external problems, including whether or not to seek assistance from others and in doing so to limit its
freedom by making commitments to them. States develop their own strategies, chart their own
courses, make their own decisions about how to meet whatever needs they experience and whatever
desires they develop.
WALTz, supra note 31, at 96.
53. See generally Glenn Snyder, The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics, 36 WoRLD
POL. 461 (1984) (discussing the dilemma resulting from lack of knowledge of others in-
tentions in the securities realm); Robert Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,
30 WoRLD PoL. 167 (1978).
54. In this environment, state interaction is often treated as zero-sum. That is, the
gains of one state are viewed as the loss of another state. A related issue, and one that has
received significant attention, concerns the importance of relative and absolute gains. See
generally John Matthews, Current Gains and Future Outcomes: When Cumulative Relative
Gains Matter, 21 INT'L ORG. 112 (Summer 1996); Joseph Grieco, The Relative Gains
Problem for International Cooperation, 87 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 729 (1993); Duncan Sni-
dal, Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation, 85 AM. POL. Sci. R~v.
701 (1991); Robert Powell, Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations The-
ory, 85 AM. POL. Scr. REv. 1303 (1991); Michael Mastanduno, Do Relative Gains Matter?
America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy, 16 INT'L SEC. 73 (Summer 1991).
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Several heuristic devices have been used to portray this view of the interna-
tional system and its effect on state behavior. A common model used is analyzing
the international system is the decentralized order of the market.55 In the decen-
tralized market, there is no formal authority or mechanism to regulate behavior.
Firms act as rational, egoistic actors seeking to maximize their welfare. The
structural conditions of the market, however, may contribute to inefficient behav-
ior.56 For example, an actor that cannot be excluded from obtaining the benefits
of a public good once the good is produced has little incentive to contribute vol-
untarily to the production of that good.57 These actors may seek to benefit from
the production of the public good without contributing to its development or
maintenance. Under these conditions, the public good may be weakened or extin-
guished. Alternatively, a public good may never be created if it requires coopera-
tion by several actors. This phenomenon has been referred to as both the logic of
collective action and the tragedy of the commons-rational, egoistic actors will
seek to maximize individual utility, even at the cost of the common good.58
This dynamic also occurs among sovereign states in the international system
where there is no formal authority or mechanism to regulate state behavior. 59 In
55. See generally KEoHANE, supra note 45, at 27.
56. See PUBLIC GOODS AND MAPR FAILmRS: A CRmcAL ANaysis (Tyler Coyin
ed., 1992); Francis Bator, The Anatomy of MarketFailure, 72 Q. J. EcoN. 351 (1958).
57. EuZoR OSTRO,% GVo a nam CoxeioNs: THE EVOLUTION OF ItzsTTUois FOx
COLLECTIVE ACTION 6 (1990). A public good consists of two elements: jointness of supply
and nonexcludability. Consumption by one user does not reduce the amount of public good
available to other users. In addition, no one can be excluded from benefiting from the pub-
lic good.
58. MA*CR OLSON, TrE LoGIc OF CoLLanvs AcnoN Puauc GooDs A=o Tm
THEORY OF GRouPs 2 (1965). The logic of collective action was identified by Mancur 01-
son. According to Olson, "unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or
unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their com-
mon interest, rational, self-interested individuals idll not act to achieve their common or
group interests." In other words, even if all of the individuals in a large group are rational
and self-interested, and would gain it as a group, they acted to achieve their common in-
terest or objective, they will still not voluntarily act to achieve that common or group inter-
est See also TODD SANDLER, CouLnCv= ACTIoN (1992); MicHAEL TAYLo, THE
Possmirry OF COOPERAnON (1987).
The tragedy of the commons was identified by Garrett Hardin. As an example,
Hardin described a pasture used by several herders to feed their cattle. Each herder has an
interest in allowing his own cattle to use the pasture. However, if each herder allows their
cattle to use the pasture without limits, the pasture vll gradually deteriorate from overuse.
"'herein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his
herd vAthout limit - in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination tonard which all
men rush, each pursuing his ovu best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of
the commons." Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Scnm:cB 1243, 1244
(1968).
59. See, e.g., John Conybeare, Public Goods, Prisoners' Dilemmas and the Interna-
tional Political Economy, 28 INT'L STUD. Q. 5 (1984); Bruce Russett, Collective Goods
and International Organization, 25 ITr'L STUD. Q. 845 (1971).
1997]
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
this arena, states act as rational, egoistic actors seeking to maximize their wel-
fare.60 "Like firms in a market, rational self-interested states interact in an effort
to improve their own welfare on political, military and economic issues, more or
less impersonally, in a decentralized arena." 6 1 The structural conditions of the
international system contribute to inefficient behavior. Thus, states may seek to
benefit from the production of a public good without contributing to its develop-
ment or maintenance. Under these conditions, the public good may be weakened
or extinguished. Alternatively, a public good may never be created if it requires
cooperation by two or more states. In the international system, public goods in-
clude increased national security, open trade and environmental regulation.62
The Prisoner's Dilemma provides an even more formal model of the interna-
tional system and its effect on state behavior.6 3 The Prisoner's Dilemma illus-
trates how competing interests between two egoistic actors can lead to sub-optimal
behavior.6 4 The Prisoner's Dilemma is typically modeled as a 2 x 2 matrix. Each
player has two options: cooperate or defect. The respective payoffs received by the
players will depend upon the opposing player's actions. The highest payoff for
each player is gained if she defects and the opposing player cooperates. Similarly,
the lowest payoff, referred to as the "sucker's payoff," is gained if she cooperates
and the opposing player defects. The Prisoner's Dilemma contains four additional
60. The rationality assumption suggests that states have ordered preferences and pur-
sue those preferences accordingly. Rationality, however, is an ideal. Like individuals,
states face uncertainty due to lack of information and limited processing capacities. See
generally PAuL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
126-40 (1992); KEoHANE, supra note 45, at 65-84, 110-32; HERBERT SIMON, MODELS OF
BouNDED RATIONALrrY (1982).
61. Abbott, supra note 10, at 375.
62. The Prisoner's Dilemma is one example of game theory, which seeks to provide
formal models of social situations. Other games include Chicken, Stag Hunt and coordi-
nation games. See, e.g., Developments in the Lav-International Environmental Law, 104
H.Av. L. Rnv. 1484 (1991); Charles Kindleberger, International Public Goods Without
International Government, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 1 (1986); Bruce Russett & John Sullivan,
Collective Goods and International Organization, 25 INT'L ORG. 845 (1971); Mancur Ol-
son & Richard Zeckhauser, An Economic Theory ofAlliances, 48 Ray. EcoN. & STAT. 266
(1966).
63. The Prisoner's Dilemma is typically described in the following manner:
Two criminals are arrested, but the district attorney does not have enough evidence to convict either
of them for serious charges unless one or both confess to the crime. The district attorney separates the
two and makes the following offer to each: "If you confess and your partner does not, I will grant you
immunity, and you will walk out free. However, if your partner squeals, and you don't, I'm going to
throw the book at you. If neither of you confesses, then I'll have to settle for misdemeanor charges,
which will get you each a brief prison term. If you both confess, I'll get you both on felony charges,
but I'll argue for shorter sentences than if you do not confess and your partner does. Think about it
and tell me what you want to do.
Morrow, supra note 45, at 78. See also ERIc RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN
INTRODUCTION To GAM THEORY 28-29 (1989); ANATOL RAPOPORT & ALBERT CHAMMAl,
PRISONER'S DaEmA (1965).
64. See Abbott, supra note 10, at 354-75.
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elements. First, there is no mechanism for making enforceable threats or com-
mitments. 65 Second, there is no way to ascertain what the other player will do.66
Third, there is no way to avoid interaction with the other player. 67 Fourth, the




Player I Cooperate 3,3 0,5
Defect 5, 0 1, 1
If the Prisoner's Dilemma is played for only one round, both players will de-
fect.69 This occurs for two reasons. Each player has an offensive reason to defect.
The highest payoff that can be received requires a player to defect. In addition,
each player has a defensive reason to defect The lowest payoff that can be re-
ceived occurs when a player cooperates and the other player defects. In this set-
ting, there is no reason to cooperate because there is no likelihood of retaliation
and there is no interest in developing a good, or bad, reputation.70 Indeed, joint
defection also occurs if the Prisoner's Dilemma is played for a finite number of
rounds.
7 1
At first glance, the Prisoner's Dilemma paints a grim portrait for the likelihood
of cooperative action among egoistic actors. Further studies, however, have dis-
covered some important exceptions. If the Prisoner's Dilemma is extended for an
indefinite number of interactions, cooperation is more likely to emerge between
the two players. Robert Axelrod discovered that a strategy of reciprocity (referred
to as Tit-for-Tat) could promote cooperation in an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. 72




69. Id. at 8-9.
70. On the importance of reputation, see David Kreps & Robert Wilson, Reputation
and Imperfect Information, 27 . ECON. TH-oaY 253 (1982) (discussing the role of reputa-
tion in game theory).
71. AxEROD, supra note 65, at 10. According to Axelrod, "[tihe Prisoner's Dilemma
is simply an abstract formulation of some very common and very interesting situations in
Which What is best for each person individually leads to mutual defection, viereas every-
one would have been better off with mutual cooperation." Id. at 9; Reinhard Selten, The
Chain Store Paradox, 9 TnEoRY AND DEcIsiON 127 (1978); R DUNCAN LUcE & HoWARD
RAIFrA, GAmis AND DncIsioNs 94-102 (1957).
72. Robert Axelrod conducted a Computer Prisoner's Dilemma Tournament to deter-
mine the best strategy in an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Numerous entries of varying
complexity were run against each other. The most successful strategy was Tit-for-Tat.
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The Tit-for-Tat strategy requires an individual to cooperate in the first round of
interaction and match an opponent's moves in subsequent rounds. 73 If an oppo-
nent cooperates, Tit-for-Tat strategy rewards the action by cooperating in the next
round. If the opponent defects, however, Tit-for-Tat strategy punishes the defec-
tion in the next round. In the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, therefore, the long-
term benefits of cooperation outweigh the short-term benefits of defection.74 Ac-
cording to Axelrod, "[a]s long as the interaction is not iterated, cooperation is
very difficult. That is why an important way to promote cooperation is to arrange
that the same two individuals will meet each other again, be able to recognize
each other from the past, and to recall how the other has behaved until now. This
continuing interaction is what makes it possible for cooperation based on reci-
procity to be stable."
75
This view of the international system, which acknowledges the existence of an-
archy but also recognizes the potential for cooperation, provides the foundation to
the theory of institutionalism.
B. THE THEORY OF INSTITUTIONALISM
The theory of institutionalism begins with two basic assumptions.76 First.
states are the principal actors in international affairs and function as rational,
egoistic actors. Second, the international system is anarchic in nature. The fun-
AXELROD, supra note 65, at 27-54. For an analysis of other player strategies in the Pris-
oner's Dilemma, see Morton Deutsch et al., Strategies of Inducing Cooperation: An Ex-
perimental Study, 11 J. CONFLiCT REsOL. 345 (1967); V. Edwin Bixenstine et al., Effects of
Level of Cooperative Choice by the Other Player on Choices in a Prisoner's Dilemma
Game Part I, 66 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCHOL. 308 (1963); V. Edwin Bixenstine & Kel-
logg V. Wilson, Effects of Level of Cooperative Choice by the Other Player on Choices in
a Prisoner's Dilemma Game, Part 11, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 139 (1963).
73. AXELROD, supra note 65, at 136-39. A significant limitation to this strategy is that
the game can configure forever. Id. at 138. This is known as the echo effect. Axelrod sug-
gests that to resolve such problems, "[a] better strategy might be to return only nine-tenths
of a tit for a tat. This would help dampen the echoing of conflict and still provide an in-
centive to the other player not to try any gratuitous defections." Id.
74. See generally Gary Bornstein et al., The Effect of Repeated Play in the IPG and
IPD Team Games, 38 J. CONLiCT REs. 690 (1994); Eliot Sober, Stable Cooperation in It-
erated Prisoners'Dilemmas, 8 EcoN. & PHI. 127 (1992); David Kreps, Rational Coop-
eration in Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 245 (1982). But see
Stuart Oskamp & David Perlman, Factors Affecting Cooperation in a Prisoner's Dilemma
Game, 9 J. CONFLiCTRESOL. 359 (1962).
75. AxELROD, supra note 65, at 125.
76. See generally Robert 0. Keohane & Lisa Martin, The Promise of Institutionalist
Theory, 20 INT'L SEc. 39 (1995); Robert Axelrod & Robert 0. Keohane, Achieving Coop-
eration Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions, in COoPERAnoN UNDER ANARCHY 226
(Kenneth Oye ed., 1986); Charles Lipson, International Cooperation in Economic and Se-
curity Affairs, 37 WORLD PoL. 1 (1984) (discussing strategic interaction and the prisoner's




damental element of institutionalist theory, however, concerns the significance of
institutions. Specifically, institutionalist theory suggests that institutions can pro-
mote cooperation even in the absence of a common government or other formal
governance structure.
77
Institutions are broadly defined as "persistent and connected sets of rules (for-
mal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape
expectations."78 They are not simple, ad hoc arrangements concerning discrete
transactions. Rather, institutions involve long-term relationships between inter-
ested actors. Institutions vary across three dimensions: uniformity, specificity and
autonomy.79 Uniformity refers to the extent that expectations and norms of con-
duct are shared by participants. Specificity describes the degree to which these ex-
pectations and norms of conduct are clearly specified and unambiguous. Auton-
omy refers to the ability of the institution to act independently without reference
or resort to an external agent. As the level of these dimensions increases, the in-
stitution becomes stronger and more cohesive.
The underlying nature of an institution resides in its core norms, which are the
77. See generally ORAN YouNG, InERNATIo,,AL GovmRANCE: PROrECTINm nm
ENvmoizimrr IN A STATELESS SOCIETY 15-19 (1994); Go ANCE WrTour
GOVmm rMNT. ORDER & CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto
Czempiel eds., 1992); ROBERT ELLIKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAXr. How NEimGoRs SETTLE
DispuTEs (1991).
78. Keohane, supra note 11, at 386. Oran Young defines institutions as "sets of rules
of the game or codes of conduct that serve to define social practices, assign roles to the
participants in these practices, and guide the interactions among occupants of these roles."
YounG, supra note 77, at 3. Douglass North defines institutions as "a set of rules, compli-
ance procedures, and moral and ethical behavioral norms designed to constrain the behav-
ior of individuals in the interests of maximizing the wealth or utility of principals."
DouGLASs NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANrE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 20 1-2 (1981). Institu-
tions are the intellectual successors of international regimes. Regimes were defined as
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around wich actor expectations
converge in a given issue-area. However, institutions and regimes are viewed as s)nony-
mous in this article. See Keohane, supra note 11, at 384; Stephen Krasner, Stnctural
Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in Iri'ATim.,L
REG n s 2 (Stephen Krasner, ed., 1983). See also ORN YOUNG, IN;TEATIONAL
COOPERATIoN. BUmDING REGses FOR NATumAL Rssouicss AmD THE ErmoaiaTrr
(1989); Stephan Haggard & Beth Simmons, Theories of International Regimes, 41 IT'L
ORG. 491 (1987). Because of its expansive nature, the concept of institutions is often sub-
ject to criticisms of being overbroad and somewhat vague. See, e.g., Anmn STr~r, WHY
NATIoNs COOPERATE: CIRcuc lANCE AND CHOICE IN INTERATIOAL REIATIOh'S 25-27
(1990); Susan Strange, Cave! HicDragones: A Critique ofRegimeAnalysis, 36 hrf'L ORG.
479 (Spring 1982).
79. Robert 0. Keohane, Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics,
in ROBERT O. KEOHANE, INTERNATIONAL InsroNs AND STATE PovR 4-5 (1989). For a
related set of dimensions, see Elizabeth Kier & Jonathan Mercer, Setting Precedents in
Anarchy: Military Intervention and Weapons of Mass Destruction, 20 Ir'L SEc. 77, 87-96
(Spring 1996).
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"standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations." 80 In addition,
formal or informal rules exist to regulate adherence to these norms. While not re-
quired, the norms and rules of institutions are often codified in international
agreements and embodied in formal organizations. 81 Institutions include such di-
verse cooperative arrangements as the European Union (EU), the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO).82 They can also include less formal arrangements such as the arms
control regime established by the United States and the Soviet Union and the con-
vention on diplomatic immunity existing prior to the Vienna Convention on Dip-
lomatic Relations. 83
Institutionalist theory suggests that institutions can promote cooperation in the
absence of a common government or other formal governance structure. They do
so by providing "a stable environment for mutually beneficial decision-making as
they guide and constrain behavior." 84 Specifically, institutions promote coopera-
tion in several ways.
Promote Iteration
The Prisoner's Dilemma reveals how cooperation is unlikely to emerge if in-
teraction is limited to a single round. In a discrete and short-term relationship,
there is no incentive to cooperate if defection will lead to greater individual gains.
Here, parties are typically indifferent to developing a reputation for cooperation.
In addition, the fear of retaliation is absent because interaction only lasts one
round.
Institutions establish the basis for long-term relationships, thereby replacing
short-term calculations with long-term strategic analysis. By extending the rela-
tionship beyond a single round of interaction, the importance of reputation and
the relevance of reciprocity are significantly increased. 85 In addition, by cluster-
80. John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, 19 INT'L
SEC. 5, 8 (Winter 1994/1995).
81. Keohane, supra note 79, at 5; Mearsheimer, supra note 80, at 8-9.
82. See Keohane, supra note 11, at 384; Lipson, supra note 75, passim.
83. See Keohane, supra note 79, at 4.
84. Snidal, supra note 14, at 127.
85. For a discussion of how reputation and reciprocity increase the likelihood of coop-
eration, see generally Eliot Sober, Stable Cooperation in Iterated Prisoners' Dilemmas, 8
EcoN. & Pim. 127 (1992); Jack Hirshleifer & Juan Martinez-Coll, What Strategies Can
Support the Evolutionary Emergence of Cooperation?, 32 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 367 (1988);
Kenneth Oye, Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies, 38
WORLDPoL. 1, 12-18 (Oct. 1985); AxEI.ROD, supra note 65, at 3-24, 169-91; David Kreps,
Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, 27 J. EcoN. THEoRY
245 (1982). Hans Morgenthau also recognized the importance of reciprocity in enforcing
rules of international law:
The great majority of the rules of international law are generally observed by all nations with-
out actual compulsion, for it is generally in the interest of all nations concerned to honor thoir obliga-
tions under international law. A nation will hesitate to infringe upon the rights of foreign diplomats
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ing issues together in the same forums over a long period of time, they help to
bring governments into continuing interaction with one another, reducing incen-
tives to cheat and enhancing the value of reputation. Finally, by establishing le-
gitimate standards of behavior for states to follow, institutions create the basis for
decentralized enforcement founded on the principle of reciprocity. 86
Thus, institutions contribute to the evolution of cooperation by lengthening the
shadow of the future, thereby increasing the importance of reputation and allow-
ing the principle of reciprocity to influence state behavior.
Reduce Transaction Costs
It is generally recognized that transaction costs plague all contractual ar-
rangements. Transaction costs are the costs of arranging, monitoring and enforc-
ing an agreement They have been defined as the "costs of running the economic
systen." 87 Transaction costs affect behavior on several levels. They make it ex-
pensive and time-consuming for firms to enter into agreements. As a result, con-
tractual arrangements will often be incomplete because transaction costs make it
extremely difficult for parties to develop exhaustive agreements that address all
possi'ble contingencies that may arise in the course of their relationship. 88 Trans-
residing in its capital; for it has an interest, identical hith the interests of al other nation:6 in the uni-
versal observance of the rules of international law which extend their protection to its ovn diplomatic
representatives in foreign capitals as well as the foreign diplomats in its ovu capital. A nation vl
likewise be reluctant to disregard its obligations under a commercial treaty, since the bmdits that it
expects from the execution of the treaty by the other contracting parties are complementary to tho-e
anticipated by the latter. It may thus stand to lose more than it would gain by nat fulfilling its part of
the bargain. This is particularly so in the long run, since a nation that has the reputation of reeging
on its commercial obligations will find it hard to conclude commercial treaties btneficial to itselfi
Most rules of international law formulate in legal terms such identical or complementary inter-
est& It is for this reason that they generally enforce th=e lv as it wee, and that thc is generally
no need for a specific enforcement action.
MORGENTHAu, supra note 3, at 312-13.
86. KEoHANE, supra note 45, at 244-45. Keohane defines reciprocity as "xechanges of
roughly equivalent values in which the actions of each party are contingent on the prior
actions of the others in such a -way that good is returned for good, and bad for bad."
Robert 0. Keohane, Reciprocity in International Relations, 40 IhN'L O11. 1, 8 (Winter
1986). Keohane further distinguishes between specific and diffuse reciprocity. Specific
reciprocity refers to situations in vhich specified partners exchange items of equivalent
value in a strictly delimited sequence. In contrast, diffuse reciprocity refers to a situation
where "the definition of equivalence is less precise, one's partners may be vewed as a
group rather than as particular actors, and the sequence of events is less narrowly
bounded." Id. at 4.
87. Numerous definitions exist for transaction costs. For example, they have been de-
fined as "the costs of all resources required to transfer property rights from one economic
agent to another. They include the costs of making an exchange (e.g., discovering exchange
opportunities, negotiating exchange, monitoring, and enforcement), and the costs of main-
taining and protecting the institutional structure (e.g., judiciary, police, armed forces).
SVETOZARPEjOViCI, EcoN oIc ANALYSIS OF INSTMMroNS AND SysTm.s 84 (1995).
88. Geoffirey Garrett, International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The Euro-
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action costs also make it expensive for firms to maintain such agreements. In
sum, transaction costs provide a significant limitation to the development and
maintenance of contractual arrangements.
Transaction costs affect all contractual arrangements, including the develop-
ment and operation of international institutions.89 Like firms engaged in private
contractual relations, states also involve themselves in the negotiation and imple-
mentation of contractual agreements. These contractual arrangements are also
subject to transaction costs. Transaction costs make it expensive and time-
consuming for states to enter into agreements. Significant costs are associated
with bringing the parties together, coming to terms and finalizing the agree-
ment.90 As a result, international agreements will often be incomplete because
states cannot make exhaustive agreements that address all possible contingencies
that may arise in the course of their relationship. Transaction costs also make it
expensive for states to maintain agreements. Thus, transaction costs provide a
significant obstacle to the development and maintenance of international agree-
ments.9 1
Institutions reduce transaction costs in several ways.92 First, they reduce the
pean Community's Internal Market, 46 INT'L ORG. 533, 557 (Spring 1992). See also David
Kreps & Robert Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect Information, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 253
(Aug. 1982); Paul Milgrom & Paul Roberts, Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs and the
Organization of Economic Activity, in PERSPECTIVES ON PosrIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 60
(James Alt & Kenneth Shepsle, eds., 1990); Ronald Dye, Costly Contract Contingencies,
26 INT'L EcoN. REv. 233 (1985).
89. For examples of the application of transaction cost economics to international is-
sues, see David Kang, South Korean and Taiwanese Development and the New Institu-
tional Economics, 49 INT'L ORG. 555 (1995) (reviewing recent literature on South Korea
and Taiwan's economy from a transaction cost approach); Beth Yarbrough & Robert Yar-
brough, International Contracting and Territorial Control: The Boundary Question, 150 J.
INST. & THEOR. EcoN. 239 (1994); Hendrik Spruyt, Institutional Selection in International
Relations: State Anarchy as Order, 48 INT'L ORG. 527 (1994) (discussing the reasons sov-
ereign territorial states replaced other institutional possibilities); Mark Tilton, Informal
Market Governance in Japan's Basic Materials Industries, 48 INT'L ORo. 663 (1994);
Beth V. Yarbrough & Robert M. Yarbrough, International Institutions and the New Eco-
nomics of Organization, 44 INT'L ORG. 235 (1990) (outlining and reviewing several rele-
vant characteristics of the "new economics of organization"); KEoHAm, supra note 45,
passim (discussing the existing cooperation between the advanced capitalist countries).
90. Multilateral negotiations often take many years to complete. For example, nego-
tiations for the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention lasted eight years, while negotiations for
the Uruguay Round Agreements took seven years.
91. Friedrich Kratochwil, Contract and Regimes: Do Issue Specificiy and Variations
of Formality Matter?, in REGIME THEORY AND INTEPNATIONAL RELATIONS 73 (Volker
Rittberger ed., 1995). Friedrich Kratochwil suggests a comparable approach to the study
of regimes and transaction costs. He distinguishes among five forms of contracts: the spot
contract, the spot contract with sequential performance, the simple incomplete contract, the
complex long-term contract, and a contract imposing obligations on an existing relation-
ship. He suggests that regimes come closest to long-term incomplete contracts. Id. at 76.
92. See generally KEoHAN, supra note 45, at 89-109 (discussing the cost benefits of
[VOL. 12:2
INSTITUTIONALIST THEORY
costs associated with the negotiation of agreements. 93 In the absence of institu-
tions, states must identify and negotiate each agreement de nero.94 In contrast, an
institution provides a preexisting framework for negotiations. 95 Second, institu-
tions reduce the costs of maintaining agreements once they have been reached by
providing an organizational framework, an administrative staff and a forum for
meetings.9 6 Third, institutions minimize the consequences of incomplete agree-
ments by sketching the broad "rules of the game and then delegat[ing] the
authority to apply and adapt these rules to specific cases." 97 Alternatively, insti-
tutions can establish formal mechanisms that address new issues. For example,
the legal system of the EU, which includes the European Court of Justice, the
Court of First Instance and the courts of member states, interprets the guidelines
set forth in EU legislation. Thus, it "provides a mechanism through which the
types of general agreements about the rules of the game supplied by the [EU]
treaties and internal market directives can be applied to the myriad interactions
that constitute the [EU] economy."9 8 Because of its role, many scholars view the




Certain mechanisms can promote self-reinforcing behavior. For example, a fo-
cal point is a principle or rule around which the expectations and actions of actors
can converge.100 Focal points may exist or develop without conscious effort, or
maybe constructed from the actions of others.10 1 "When one principle singles out
a unique equilibrium and other principles do not give a clear-cut answer, the first
institutions in negotiating agreements).
93. See id. at 90 (stating that organized institutions make it more convenient and
cheaper than states to negotiate agreements).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 90-92.
96. Id. at 90.
97. See Garrett, supra note 88, at 557.
98. Id. at 558.
99. See generally Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A
Political Theory of Legal Integration, 47 IT'fL ORG. 41 (1993) (developing a theory to ex-
plain the impact of the Court in the ElU); J.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe,
100 YA L. J. 2403 (1991) (discussing the evolution of law in the European Community),
G. Federico Mancini, The Making of a Constitution for Europe, 26 Co:.e.ioN MAsu L.
Rnv. 595 (1989) (discussing the rise of European Community law); Alex Easson, Legal
Approaches to European Integration: The Role of Court and Legislator in the Completion
of the European Common Market, 12 J. Eu. INTEGRATION 101 (1988).
100. See ScHELmG, TBE STRATEGY oF CoNFUIcT, supra note 45, at 57-58. See also
David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in P:snnEcTivEs Oj PosmvE
POLIcALEcoNoMY 90, 120-23 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., 1990).
101. See Geoffrey Garrett & Barry R. Weingast, Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Con-
structing the European Community's Internal Market, in Goldstein & Keohane, supra note
28, at 173, 176.
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tends to be applied .... -102 Path dependence reinforces the behavior of the iden-
tified principle or rule. 103 The concept of path dependence suggests that when "a
development path is set on a particular course, the network externalities, the
learning process of organizations, and the historically derived subjective modeling
of the issues reinforce the course." 104 Several elements promote path depend-
ence, 105 including: (1) large setup or fixed costs, which give the advantage of fal-
ling unit costs as output increases; 106 (2) learning effects, which improve products
or lower their costs as their prevalence increases; 107 (3) coordination effects,
which confer advantages to cooperation with other economic agents taking similar
action; 108 and (4) adaptive expectations, where increased prevalence on the mar-
ket enhances beliefs of further prevalence. 10 9 The phenomenon of sunk costs is
another mechanism that promotes self-reinforcing behavior. Sunk costs are pre-
committed costs originally invested in a project and, therefore, cannot be re-
trieved.110 "[I]f these sunk costs make a traditional pattern of action cheaper, and
if new patterns are not enough more profitable to justify throwing away the re-
source, the sunk costs tend to preserve a pattern of action from one year to the
next." 111
Institutions can also promote self-reinforcing behavior in a variety of ways. For
example, the norms and rules underlying an institution may serve as a focal point
for state behavior. 112 "By embodying, selecting, and publicizing particular paths
on which all actors are able to coordinate, institutions may provide a constructed
focal point."113 Institutions allow states to coordinate their actions along a chosen
norm or rule, and serve as a guide for other states.114 As states begin to behave in
102. Kreps, supra note 100, at 121.
103. For a discussion of path dependence, see S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis,
Path Dependence, Lock-In and History, 11 J. L. EcoN. & ORG. 205 (1995) (illustrating
three different forms of path dependence); INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN
THE ECONOMY (W. Brian Arthur ed., 1994); Paul David, CLIO and the Economics of
QWERTY, 75 Am. ECON. REV. 332-37 (1985).
104. DOUGLASS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 99 (1990).
105. W. Brian Arthur, Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms in Economics, in TBE ECONOMY As
AN EVOLVING COMPLEX SYSTEM (Philip Anderson et al. eds., 1988). See generally W.
Brian Arthur, Positive Feedbacks in the Economy, ScI. AM. 92 (Feb. 1990) (discussing the
theory of positive feedback).
106. Arthur, supra note 105, at 93.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Arthur, supra note 105, at 10; NORTH, supra note 104, at 94.
110. See WILLAM J. BAUMOL, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 145 (6th ed. 1994).
111. ARTHUR STiNCHCOMBE, CONSTRUCTING SOCIAL TroRIEs 121 (1968).
112. See Kreps, supra note 100, at 120-31 (providing a general discussion on apprecia-
tion of focal points in the corporate setting).
113. Garrett & Weingast, supra note 101, at 176.
114. See Wayne Sandholtz, Institutions and Collective Action: The Nmv Telecommuni-
cations in Western Europe, 45 WORLD POL. 242 (1993) (stating that institutions may serve
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a certain manner, path dependence reinforces this course of action. 115 Institutions
"allow governments to take advantage of potential economies of scale. Once a re-
gime has been established, the marginal cost of dealing with each additional issue
will be lower than it would be without a regime."11 6 As institutions develop, they
become more efficient in their behavior and integrated with other institutions. As
a result, institutions increase their influence. Finally, because the development of
institutions is both time-consuming and resource intensive, states Will be less in-
clined to violate an agreement and risk losing their underlying investment. Insti-
tutions, therefore, impose significant costs on states seeking to withdraw.
117
Establish Property Rights
The existence of ambiguous property rights can significantly impede coopera-
tion. "Property rights and other entitlements that are poorly defined and costly to
determine can be an impediment to bargaining in any market setting."1 18 In the
short-term, ambiguous property rights may contribute to uncertainty, resulting in
increased negotiating costs as states seek to determine their respective rights and
obligations. If this uncertainty is not resolved, competition is more likely as states
continue to argue over conflicting perceptions on property rights. This uncertainty
indeed may lead to confrontations. Further, ambiguous property rights are ineffi-
cient, because they impede the proper allocation of resources.
1 19
Institutions can play a prominent role in identifying and allocating property
rights.120 The creation of institutions requires states to discuss their respective
rights and obligations at the outset. This process can lead to a better understand-
ing of property rights. Moreover, this understanding is often codified in explicit
as a source to promote technological and market changes).
115. See KEOHANE, supra note 45, at 92 (stating that institutions encourage agreements
consistent with their principles in a particular issue-area while discouraging those agree-
ments inconsistent with the institution).
116. Id. at 90.
117. Snidal, supra note 14, at 132. See also ALBERT HjRscmi.A, Exrr, VoicE Arm
LoYATY (1970) (analyzing several economic processes designed to resolve a range of so-
cial, political, and moral issues).
118. Abbott, supra note 10, at 397. See also Carol Rose, Crystals andAfid in Property
Law, 40 STx. L. REv. 577, 608 (1988) (discussing the development of laws intended to
clarify ambiguous property law); Clifford Holderness, A Legal Foundation for Exchange,
14 J. LEcAL STmD. 321, 322-26 (1985) (arguing that exchange requires assignment of
rights that are specific and narrow); Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, Information Un-
certainty and the Transfer of Property, 13 J. LE AL STUD. 299, 312-18 (1984) (enphasiz-
ing the importance of an accurate filing system in ascertaining property rights); Thomas NL
Carroll et al., The Market as a Commons: An Unconventional View ofProperty Rights, 13
J. ECoN. IssuEs 605 (1979) (discussing the relationship betveen property rights and mar-
ket activity).
119. Holderness, supra note 118, at 322-24.
120. See Abbott, supra note 10, at 396-98 (discussing the importance of well-defined
property rights law); KEOHANE, supra note 45, at 88-89; John Conybeare, International
Organization and the Theory ofProperty Rights, 34 Ihq'L ORG. 307 (1980).
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language. Such formal codification will reduce uncertainty and promote stable
expectations. In addition, institutions can establish mechanisms which clarify
property rights in the event a dispute arises. For example, the EU legal system
regularly adjudicates claims regarding the rights and obligations of member
states. 121 While European legislation sets forth the responsibilities of member
states, the EU legal system can adjudicate disputes involving these rights and ob-
ligations as well as address any new issues. 122 Thus, this system reduces ambi-
guities regarding property rights between member states. 123
Promote Issue Linkage
Issue linkage can provide an important contribution to the development of co-
operation.124 It can increase the amount of bargaining that takes place by pro-
moting trade-offs in one issue area with another. 125 While a state may be unwill-
ing to cooperate on one issue, it may find a compelling reason to cooperate if
another issue area is presented. 126 "Clustering of issues under a regime facilitates
side-payments among these issues: more potential quids are available for the
quo."' 127 In addition, issue linkage can increase the consequences of a rule viola-
tion. A violation in one issue area may be punished in another issue area. Thus,
"[iut discourages cheating in much the same way as iteration: it raises the costs of
121. See generally GORDON SLYNN, INTRODUCING A EUROPEAN LEoAL ORDER (1992)
(discussing the development of the law Community in Europe); L. NvvmE BROWN &
FRANcis JACOBS, THE CouRT OF JusTIcE OF TiE EURoPEAN CoMMUNrriEs (1989); T.C.
HARnTEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EURoPEAN CoMMUNITY LAW (1988) (discussing the basic
principles of European Community law); Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a
Transnational Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1981) (discussing the case law of the
ECJ).
122. See SLYNN, supra note 121, at 54-61.
123. Id.
124. See generally ROGE_ FisHER & WmLiAm URY, GE=ING To YEs: NEGOTATING
AGREEvmur WrrnHotrr GivG IN 56-80 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing negotiating teclniques);
HOWARDRAiFA, THE ARTAND SCIENCE OFNEGOTIATON 13,285-87 (1982) (discussing the
positive impact of linkages in the negotiation process).
125. KEoHANE, supra note 45, at 92.
126. The benefits of issue linkage have been recognized for many years. For example,
Francois de Callieres noted in 1716:
An ancient philosopher once said that friendship between men is nothing but a commerce in which
each seeks his own interest. The same is true or even truer of the liaisons and treaties which bind one
sovereign to another, for there is no durable treaty which is not founded on reciprocal advantage, and
indeed a treaty which does not satisfy this condition is no treaty at all, and is apt to contain the seeds
of its own dissolution. Thus, the great secret of negotiations is to bring out prominently the common
advantage to both sides of any proposal, and so to link these advantages that they may appear equally
balanced to both parties.
Francois De Callieres, ON THE MANNER OF NEGOTIATiNG wrrH PRINCES 109-10 (AF White
trans., Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1963) (1716).
127. KEOHANE, supra note 45, at 91.
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cheating and provides a way for the victim to retaliate against the cheater " 12 8
Institutions provide an excellent environment for promoting issue linkage.
129
Indeed, "[w]ithout international regimes linking clusters of issues to one another,
side-payments and linkages would be difficult to arrange in world polities; in the
absence of a price system for the exchange of favors, institutional barriers would
hinder the construction of mutually beneficial bargains." 130 For example, the re-
cent Uruguay Round negotiations provide an example of the benefits of issue link-
age. This trade round encompassed a variety of distinct issues. 13 1 Agreements
were reached in such substantive areas as agriculture, textiles, clothing, invest-
ment matters, services and intellectual property. Agreements were also reached on
procedural issues such as rules of origin, technical barriers to trade, subsidies and
dispute settlement. The existence of multiple issues, both procedural and substan-
five, facilitated negotiations. The multiple issues encouraged states to compro-
mise on some issues in order to gain on other issues. 132 Issue linkage is also im-
portant for deterring rule violations. 'linkages among particular issues within the
context of [institutions] raise the costs of deception and irresponsibility, since the
consequences of such behavior are likely to extend beyond the issue on which they
are manifested."
13 3
128. Mearsheimer, supra note 80, at 18.
129. See, e.g., YouNG, supra note 77, at 24-26; Frederick IV. Mayer, Alanaging Do-
mestic Differences in International Negotiations: The Strategic Use of Internal Side-
Payments, 46 INT'L ORG. 793 (1992) (explaining the relationship between international
and domestic structures in the international negotiation process); Axelrod & Keohane, su-
pra note 76, at 239-41; James K. Sebenius, Negotiation Arithmetic: Adding and Subtract-
ing Issues and Parties, 37 INt'L ORG. 281 (1983) (discussing the importance of issues and
parties as variables in the negotiation process); Ernst B. Haas, ,1y Collaborate? Issue-
Linkage and International Regimes, 32 Wosw POL. 357 (1980) (examining the relation-
ship of interdependence of institutions as well as the need for collaboration, Robert D.
Tollison & Thomas D. Willett, An Economic Theory of Autually Advantageous Issue
Linkages in International Negotiations, 33 INT'L ORG. 425 1979) (emphasizing the impor-
tance of linkages).
130. KEoHAiN, supra note 45, at 91.
131. See generally David A. Gantz, A Post-Uruguay Round Introduction to Interna-
tional Trade Law in the United States, 12 ARIz. J. I4r'L & Comp. L. 7 (1995) (providing a
comprehensive introduction to international law as interpreted and applied by the United
States); G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analy-
sis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DuiL. 1. 829 (1995) (analyzing three different
models of the World Trade Organization and how international trade disputes should be
resolved).
132. Similar issue linkage occurred during the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea. See generally Hugo Caminos & Michael R. Molitor, Perspectives on the
New Law of the Sea: Progressive Development of International Lav and the Package Deal,
79 AiL J. Ihr'L L. 871 (1985) (discussing issue linkage in the law of the sea negotiations),
Tommy Koh, A Constitution for the Oceans, in UN= NATIom"s, THE Lw F "m ST,:
OF ciAL T=XT OF THE UNED NATIONs CONvmrTo z ON ThE LAW OF THE SEA v T AmEm
AmhINEx(1983).
133. KEoaHAN, supra note 45, at 97.
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Increase Access to Information
In international politics, uncertainty and lack of information are pervasive.
134
States can never be certain of the intentions of other states or the courses of action
available to other states. 135 As a result, information is a scarce and valued com-
modity. Indeed, it is the lack of adequate information that helps fuel the Pris-
oner's Dilemma. 136 Without adequate information regarding the other player's
abilities and intentions, a player's dominant strategy is to defect. 137 Increasing
transparency and the distribution of information thus, serve several purposes. 1
38 It
facilitates coordination among states 139 and reduces uncertainty regarding inten-
tions and available courses of action. 140 In addition, such procedures make it dif-
ficult for states to conceal potential violations, while making it easier to identify
violations.
14 1
Institutions can increase the quality and flow of information between states and
promote transparency. They can require states to provide information to other
states. 142 They can also facilitate the process whereby states gain information on
other states through their own verification procedures. 143 For example, the United
States and the former Soviet Union recognized the importance of information for
the success of their arms control agreements. Thus, they authorized the use of na-
134. See generally Abbott, supra note 13, passim (examining provisions in several in-
ternational agreements that govern the production of information); Jonathan Bendor &
Thomas Hammond, Rethinking Allison's Models, 86 Am. POL. ScL REv. 301, 303 (1992)
(detailing a model on decision making policy and amount of information received).
135. See generally KEOHANE, supra note 45, 92-93 (discussing the importance of infor-
mation for actors in reaching agreements).
136. See id. at 93-96 (explicating three important sources underlying the Prisoners'
Dilemma).
137. Id. at 93.
138. See generally ABRAM CHAYEs & ANToNIA H. CHAYEs, TmE NEw SovEnaxoNTY:
COMPLLAN CE WITH INTERNATONAL RFGULATORY AGREEmENTs 22-24; 135-73 (1996).
139. Cf. KEoHANE, supra note 45, at 94 (stating that distribution of information may not
be sufficient).
140. See id. (recommending certain measures to reduce the risks presented to members
because of the uncertainty of predicting others' behavior).
141. See generally KEOHANE, supra note 45, at 92-96 (discussing the influence of in-
stitutions to diminishing the conflicts presented in the Prisoners' Dilemma). Reporting
requirements can also influence international behavior by their impact on domestic actors.
If a state's international practice is revealed, domestic actors may seek to influence that
state's behavior. For a general discussion of the influence of domestic politics on interna-
tional behavior, see generally DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATiONAL BAROAININO
AND DOMEsTIc POLmcs (Peter Evans et al. eds., 1993); Robert Putnam, Diplomacy and
Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT'L ORG. 427 (1988) (discussing
the impact of domestic politics on international agreements).
142. Abbott, supra note 13, at 40-45.
143. Id. at 32-34, 36-40, 45-46. See also ARMS CONTROL VEAMICATION: THE
TECHNOLOGmS THAT MAKE IT PossmLE (Kosta Tsipsis et al. eds., 1986); VERIFICATION AND
ARms CONTROL (William C. Potter ed., 1985).
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tional technical means, notification procedures, the exchange of confidential data,
and the use of on-site inspections to verify compliance with arms control agree-
ments.144 Alternatively, institutions can generate and disseminate information to
states. 145 For example, the Commission of the European Union conducts exten-
sive research on the economic, social and political status of member states and
publishes this information on a regular basis. 14 Publications such as the Official
Journal of the European Communities, the Bulletin of the European Communi-
ties, and the General Report on the Activities of the European Communities pro-
vide member states with information concerning significant developments in-
volving the EU.147 In addition, institutions can establish confidence building
measures which can minimize the likelihood that actions will be misunder-
stood. 148 By increasing the distribution of information and promoting transpar-
ency, institutions reduce the uncertainty faced by states and improve the environ-
ment for cooperation. 
149
Monitor Behavior
The need for monitoring state behavior is closely related to the need for greater
information. It is widely agreed that for cooperation to evolve, participants must
know a great deal about the past behavior of other participants. "While this may
be relatively simple in dyadic interactions, the existence of multiple actors greatly
increases the probability that players will not know enough about the past behav-
ior of others to make informed strategic choices." 150 If rule violations cannot be
effectively identified, the incentives to transgress from such rules are significant.
Like the Law Merchant of medieval Europe, there must be a mechanism that
paints the scarlet letter of noncompliance on rule violators.151 Thus, mechanisms
that "monitor the behavior of parties to a cooperative agreement and identify their
144. Abbott, supra note 13, at 32-46.
145. Id. at 34-36. See also LTERNATIONAL VERFCATIoN ORGANIZATION'S (Ellis Morris
ed., 1991); JAm.s KEELEY, ToERNArioNAL ATomic ENRGY AGENcy SA-EGuARDs:
OBSERVATIONS ONLESsoNs FoR Vmur nG A Cirm,&cA. WsEPoNs CoNvmam: (1988).
146. NEmL NuGENT, Tim Govsm=ir Aim PoLmcs OF THE EuROEAij Umoi 98-121,
459 (3d ed. 1994).
147. Id. at458-60.
148. Abbott, supra note 13, at 46-49. See also Barry M. Blechman, Efforts to Reduce
the Risk of Accidental or Inadvertent War, in U.S.-SoviET SEcuRrry CcOPEATIoN 466
(Alexander L. George et al. eds., 1988) (discussing the efforts by the United States and the
Soviet Union in pursuit of reducing the risk of war); CoNFmENcn Bun. G. I EA T-WVEST
RELA oNs (Karl Bimbaum ed., 1982).
149. KFOHAiE, supra note 45, at 92-96; Young, supra note 77, at 75.
150. Garrett, supra note 88, at 557.
151. Paul Mlgrom et al., The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Aedieval
Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs, 2 EcoN. & PoL 1, 19 (1990).
See also Avner Grief et al., Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: 77 Case of the
Merchant Guild, 102 . POL. EcoN. 745 (1994) (concluding that merchant guilds expanded
the trade market in the late medieval period).
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transgressions are likely to be vital to the retaliatory and reputational processes
that undergird the logic of the iterated prisoners' dilemna." 152 Indeed, it has been
suggested that if parties are provided with adequate information regarding rule
violations, there may be no need for formal sanctioning mechanisms to ensure co-
operation. 153 Compliance can be gained through decentralized punishment by
informed parties.
Institutions can monitor state behavior and identify potential violations of es-
tablished obligations. "If institutions can provide this type of information, inter-
actions between self-interested players may then lead to the evolution of coopera-
tion in the manner that is conventionally envisaged (through 'tit for tat' and other
trigger strategies)." 154 Monitoring can include reporting requirements, consulta-
tion procedures, surveillance techniques, decentralized verification procedures
and centralized monitoring procedures. 155 The EU, for example, established vari-
ous mechanisms to monitor state compliance with EU obligations. The Commis-
sion of the European Union is primarily responsible for ensuring that member-
states meet EU obligations. 156 Indeed, it is referred to as the Guardian of the
Treaties because it is authorized to collect information, investigate non-
compliance of EU obligations and pursue litigation against violators if neces-
sary. 157 In addition, the EU legal system creates an effective and broad-based
monitoring system.158 It authorizes member states, other EU actors such as the
Commission, European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, and even private
individuals, to bring legal actions to enforce EU laws and regulations.159 Moni-
toring state behavior through these mechanisms reduces the incentives of member
states to violate EU obligations.
160
152. Garrett, supra note 88, at 540-41.
153. Garrett & Weingast, supra note 101, at 179.
154. Id.
155. CHAYEs & CHAYEs, supra note 139, at 174-96. Abbott, supra note 10, at 367.
156. NUGENT, supra note 146, at 112-118. See generally PicHAR HAY, THE EUROPEAN
COMMISSION & THE ADiNISTRATION OF THE CoNmuNrTY (1989) (explaining the admini-
stration of the European Community, particularly the role of the Commission). See also
NUGENT, supra note 146, at 112-18 (explaining how the Council of Ministers reacts to a
Commission proposal for Council legislation).
157. See Peter Ludlow, The European Commission, in T-m NEW EUROPEAN CoMUNiTY
85, 104 (Robert 0. Keohane & Stanley Hoffmann eds., 1991).
158. NUGENT, supra note 146, at 166-192. See also HmN G. SCHEMERs & DENIS F.
WAELBROECI, JuDIcIAL PROTEcnON IN T-m EUROPEAN CoMMUNrTIES (5th ed. 1992) (pro-
viding an overview of the nature of judicial protection in the EU); Ulrich Everling, The
Member States of the European Community before their Court of Justice, EUROPEAN L.
REv. 215 (1984) (discussing the relationship between the Member States of the European
Community and the International Court of Justice).
159. SCHERmERs & WAELBRO ECK, supra note 158.
160. Cf. E.A. LANDY, TEE EFIEENcnvEss OF hnrERNATiONAL SUPERVIsIcN-THRTY
YEARs OF ILO EXPERmNCE 1-2 (1966) (examining the supervisory system under the Inter-
national Labour Organization). Landy noted that "[flor the adoption of international leg-




Despite their best efforts, states will inevitably face disputes regarding agree-
ments. These can arise from ambiguities in the original agreement or through
changed or unforeseen circumstances. If these disputes remain unresolved, they
can damage a relationship. Therefore, the ability to mediate disputes, both poten-
tial and ongoing, is essential for maintaining cooperation.
161
Institutions can establish mechanisms to address issues before they become se-
rious disputes. For example, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty be-
tween the United States and the former Soviet Union established the Standing
Consultative Commission (SCC) to help mediate issues.162 Its purpose was to
provide a forum for consultation, where questions of fact and intentions could be
clarified, with the goal of reconciling differences surrounding implementation of
the agreements. 163 By most accounts, it has played an important role in main-
taining an ongoing dialogue on the ABM Treaty between the two countries. 164 In
addition, institutions can establish mechanisms to address ongoing disputes. For
example, the importance of dispute settlement has long been recognized as an in-
tegral element of the GATT system.165 In the Uruguay Round Agreements, the
dispute settlement process was significantly strengthened. A Dispute Settlement
Body was established to mediate disputes between member states. 166 It provides
an extensive range of mechanisms for the settlement of disputes including con-
add to the stability of inter-State relations, unless there also exists some degree of assur-
ance that the contracting parties really comply with their treaty obligations. This concern
that governments respect their pledged vord thus emerges as a crucial problem of the
contemporary world." Id.
161. CHAYEs & CHAYas, supra note 138, at 201-25; Kreps, supra note 100, at 92-93.
162. Robert W. Buchhein & Philip J. Farley, The U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative
Commission, in U.S.-SovIET SEcuRITY COOPERATIO, ACHVEFNmrT, FAILunE, LEssONs
254 (Alexander L. George et al., eds. 1988).
163. Id. at 256.
164. See, e.g., Sidney N. Graybeal & Patricia B. McFate, Assessing Verification and
Compliance, inDEND% mDETERRE~c 198 (Antonia IL Chayes & Paul Doty eds., 1989);
Sidney N. Graybeal & Michael Krepon, Making Better Use of the Standing Consultative
Commission, 10 INT'L SEC. 183 (Fall 1985) (discussing the unresolved problems in the
area of compliance with existing peace instruments, .Nming that they are an impediment
to the maintenance of existing agreements, and recommending how the Standing Consul-
tative Commission can be better used to resolve such compliance problems).
165. See generally ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIO,,L TRADs LAW: THE
EvoLumioN OF THE GATT LEGAL SYsTmi (1993) (presenting a history of the GAIT legal
system, concentrating on the development of GAT's procedure for adjudicating legal dis-
putes between member countries); Kenneth Abbott, The Uruguay Round and Dispute
Resolution: Building a Private-Interests System ofJustice, 1992 CoLt.. Bus. L. Rsv. 111
(analyzing the highlights of the Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations in the area
of dispute resolution).
166. See William J. Aceves, Lost Sovereignty? The Implications of the Uruguay Round,
19 FORDHAm .NT'L .3. 427 (1995); Andreas Lowenfeld, Remedies Along rith Rights: In-
stitutionalReform in the New GAIT, 88 Am. J. rr'LL. 477 (1994).
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sultation procedures, good offices, conciliation, mediation and arbitration. The
Dispute Settlement Body may also establish dispute settlement panels to adjudi-
cate claims that remain unresolved. This new dispute settlement process is viewed
as a cornerstone of the Uruguay Round Agreements.
Impose Sanctions
Finally, the importance of imposing sanctions on rule violations is evident. If
violations are not punished, a state has few incentives for complying with rules. It
could free-ride on the cooperation of other states and gain the advantages of coop-
eration without the attendant disadvantages of noncompliance. Under these con-
ditions, cooperation is less likely to emerge because of the collective action prob-
lem. Thus, there must be some consequences attached to rule violations.
Institutions can provide formal and informal sanctions for rule violations.
Formal sanctions are typically codified and provide explicit procedures for their
imposition. 167 They can encompass political, economic or diplomatic action. For
example, the Uruguay Round Agreements contain explicit procedures in the event
of a member state's rule violation. The Dispute Settlement Body can issue binding
rulings and authorize the suspension of concessions or other obligations to ensure
the implementation of its rulings. In addition to formal sanctions, institutions can
also provide the basis for informal sanctions. Informal sanctions are not codified
and do not contain explicit procedures. 168 Rather, they function on the basis of
reciprocity and reputation. While a state may gain a short-term advantage from a
rule violation, it may suffer long-term disadvantages by having developed a repu-
tation for rule violation. Other states will be less willing to enter agreements with
such states. "The sanction for violating is not penal, but exclusion from the net-
work of solidarity and cooperation."' 169 Indeed, "fuin a world of imperfect infor-
mation, where others' current and future preferences cannot be known with cer-
tainty, reputation has value." 170 A final benefit of institutions is that they provide
a collective response to rule violations. Institutions "can help overcome free rider
problems by legitimizing and assigning responsibility for retaliation, and by pro-
viding for collective enforcement."
17 1
167. See CHAYEs & CHAYES, supra note 138, at 34-87.
168. See generally id. at 88-108 (providing information regarding sanctions generally,
as well as specific examples); ELISABETH ZOLLER, PEAcETIm UNILATERAL R mEMOEs: AN
ANALYSIS OF CouNrm mAsums (1984) (discussing in detail the specific types of peace-
time unilateral remedies available as well as the legal framework within which they oper-
ate). For a discussion of non-legal sanctions in domestic affairs, see David Charny, Nonle-
gal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARv. L. REV. 373 (1990); Stewart
Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55 (1963).
169. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: Civic TRADITIONS IN MODERN
ITALY 183 (1993).
170. Charles Lipson, Why Are Some International Agreements Informal? 45 INT'L ORO.
495, 509 (1991).
171. Abbott, supra note 10, at 367. See also Axelrod & Keohane, supra note 76, at 235-
37 (explaining that international regimes have four possible configurations of interest).
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The implications of institutionalist theory are significant It suggests the need
to understand the anarchic environment within which states interact. The struc-
tural conditions imposed by anarchy have a profound impact on state behavior.
Institutionalist theory also suggests the importance of developing mechanisms
that work within this anarchic environment to reduce state incentives to defect
from agreements, thereby maximizing the likelihood of cooperation.1
7 2
The preceding analysis of institutionalist theory has identified how institutions
can promote cooperation among states even under conditions of anarchy. 173 How-
ever, this analysis should not be taken to suggest that institutions provide a pana-
cea for all international conflict. 174 There will inevitably be occasions where in-
stitutions cannot promote cooperation. In such cases of deadlock, at least one state
may prefer conflict to cooperation. Examples of deadlock are readily evident in
international affairs and can be found in a variety of settings including arms races
and trade wars.175 In these cases, it is necessary to change a state's underlying
172. See W. Michael Reisman, Institutions and Practices for Restoring and Maintain-
ing Public Order, 6 Duix J. CoMn'. & Ifr'L L. 175 (1995) (identifing eight institutional
practices and arrangements that are important for protecting public order). These include:
(1) human rights la%, the law of state responsibility, and the developing law of liability vithout fault;
(2) international criminal f'bunals, (3) universalization of the jurisdiction of national cauls for cer-
tain delicts; (4) refusal to recognize and to allow violators the be eficial consquene of actions
deemed unlawful; (5) incentives in the form of foreign aid or other re.ards; (6) comoiziom of in-
quiry or truth commissions;, (7) compensation commissions, and (8) amnesties.
Id. at 177.
173. The impact of international institutions has been identified in several areas. See,
e.g., Ronald B. Mitchell, Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Trcat,
Compliance, 48 INT'L ORG. 425 (1994); John S. Duffield, International Regimes and Alli-
ance Behavior: Explaining NATO Conventional Force Levels, 46 LNr'L ORG. 819 (1992);
Ethan A. Nadehnann, Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in Interna-
tional Society, 44 INT'L ORG. 478 (1990); Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights: A
Regime Analysis, 40 INT'L ORG. 599 (1986); Robert Jervis, Security Regimes, 36 INr'L
ORG. 357 (1982).
174. For criticisms of institutionalist theory, see Mearsheimer, supra note 80, passin,
Charles L. Glaser, Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help, 19 kr'L SEC. 50
(Winter 1994/95); Joseph M. Grieco, Understanding the Problem of International Coop-
eration: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory, in
NEoREALmi AND NEoLm Rmpusm THn CoNmiwor.tAaY DEBAM 301 (David A. Baldw'in
ed., 1993); Joseph Mi Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique
of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism in NEOtREaMS AND NEocmunAts!I. THE
CONThmPORARYDEBATE 116 (David A. Baldwin ed., 1993).
175. See, e.g., George Mi Downs et al., Arms Races and Cooperation, 38 \Vow.LD POL.
118 (Oct 1985) (explaining the advantages and disadvantages of different arms strategies
aimed at promoting cooperation); John Conybeare, Trade Wars: A Comparative Study of
Anglo-Hanse, Franco-Italian, and Havey-Smoot Conflicts, 38 WORLD POL. 147 (Oct.
1985) (analyzing three trade wars with the goal of identifying factors vvhich may promote
or inhibit cooperation); Kenneth A. Oye, The Sterling-Dollar-Franc Triangle: Monetary
Diplomacy 1929-1937, 38 WORD PoL. 173 (Oct. 1985).
19971
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
preference structure before cooperation can emerge. 176
I. THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
This section applies institutionalist theory to examine international law. Insti-
tutionalist theory provides a unique insight into the two principal sources of inter-
national law: treaty law and customary international law. 177
A. TREATY LAW
Treaties are a principal source of international law.178 A treaty is an interna-
tional agreement concluded by two or more states that codifies specified norms
and rules. Treaties can address an almost infinite variety of issues ranging from
economic matters to security issues. In addition to the substantive provisions of
particular treaties, there are a broader set of procedural rules which cover such
issues as the development, operation and termination of treaties.179 These rules
are codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Conven-
tion).18
0
Through the substantive provisions of particular treaties and the procedural
rules of the Vienna Convention, treaty law promotes cooperation as indicated by
176. Oye, supra note 85, at 4-11; Axelrod & Keohane, supra note 76, at 228-32.
177. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are
submitted to it, shall apply:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized
by the contesting states;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law,
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(d) subject to the provision of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly quali-
fied publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo ct bono, if the
parties agree thereto.
I.C.J. Statute, 59 Stat. 1055.
178. MARK W. JANs, AN INmODUCTION TO INTERATIONAL LAW 9-39 (2nd ed. 1993);
J.L. BRIERLY, THn LAw OF NATIONS 57-69 (6th ed. 1963).
179. See generally PAUL REUTER, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TREATIEs (Jose Mico &
Peter Haggenmacher trans., 1995) (providing a concise overview of the law of treaties, in-
cluding the history, legal aspects, participation requirements, and effects of treaties); T.O.
ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES (1974); LORD McNAiR, Tim LAW OF TREATIs
(1961) (providing a comprehensive work on the law of treaties including the procedural
rules of how to conclude, apply, and terminate a treaty).
180. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
39/27, at 289 (1969), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. See generally IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA
CONvENTION ON TBE LAW OF TREATIES (1984); Richard D. Keaney & Robert E. Dalton,
The Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 495 (1970) (providing a general discussion of




institutionalist theory. Treaties establish the basis for long-term relationships, re-
placing short-term calculations with long-term strategic analysis. Promoting such
long-term relationships gives rise to stable expectations between states. Treaty law
also increases the importance of reputation and the use of reciprocity to enforce
obligations. Through such mechanisms as regular consultation procedures, annual
review meetings, and dispute settlement procedures, treaties further promote it-
eration.181 The Vienna Convention also "reflects a deep and pcrvasive concern
with the promotion of iteration." 182 Its overall structure as well as "its graduated
increase in national obligations as the treaty process progresses" encourages the
development of long-term relationships. 183 In addition, treaties reduce transaction
costs and encourage self-reinforcing behavior. By establishing regularized pat-
terns of behavior, treaties promote efficiency. 184 They allow states to coordinate
their action along a chosen rule or norm, thereby reducing costs. Path depend-
ence further contributes to the maintenance of these agreements by reinforcing
behavior. Because the treaty process is both time-consuming and resource inten-
sive, states will be less inclined to violate an agreement and risk losing their un-
derlying investment These sunk costs contribute to the maintenance of the
agreement Finally, treaties define property rights as they set forth the respective
rights and obligations of states in explicit language, clarifying expectations and
further reducing uncertainty.
In addition, treaties can easily incorporate other mechanisms to promote coop-
eration. Treaty negotiations readily facilitate issue linkage of both substantive and
procedural issues. Formal agreements can increase the quality and flow of infor-
mation. They can monitor state behavior and identify potential violations of es-
tablished obligations. Treaties can also establish mechanisms to mediate potential
disputes. Finally, agreements can provide formal sanctions for rule violations.
B. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Along with treaty law, customary international law is a principal source of in-
ternational law.185 State practice that is continuous and long-standing may de-
velop into customary international law and be considered legally binding on those
states that acquiesce in its formation and development Two elements are required
for the development of customary international law. First, state practice must be
consistent 186 The emphasis on consistency is based on the notion that customary
181. Setear, supra note 10, at 212-16. In addition to intra-instrument iteration, "nations
may undertake 'inter-instnment iterations,' wich are promises in one treaty to engage in
the subsequent set of iterations involved in another treaty." Id. at 217.
182. Id. at 190.
183. Id.
184. See William I Aceves, The Economic Analysis of International Law: Transaction
Cost Economics and the Concept of State Practice, 17 U. PA. J. INT'LEco,. L. 995 (1996).
185. JAacts, supra note 178, at 41-54; BRIS Y, supra note 178, at 59-62.
186. KAROL WoLFK, Cusrom IN PREsmrr hIiOmmqo LAW 52-65 (2nd ed. 1993);
IANBRovNLm, PRINCIPLES OFPuBLIc I n OATioNAL LAw 4-6 (4th ed. 1990).
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international law depends upon its regular observance in practice. Second, state
practice must develop out of a sense of legal obligation. 187 This concept of opinio
juris provides a qualitative element to the development of customary international
law. The basis of customary international law, therefore, is the notion "that states
in and by their international practice may implicitly consent to the creation and
application of international legal rules."
1 88
Customary international law also promotes cooperation as indicated by institu-
tionalist theory. Customary practice promotes regularized patterns of behavior and
gives rise to stable expectations between states. It also increases the importance of
reputation and the use of reciprocity to enforce obligations. Because it does not
require formal negotiations, customary international law reduces transaction
costs. Customary international law allows states to establish a binding relation-
ship without resorting to the formalism of the treaty process.189 In place of formal
and time-consuming negotiations, customary international law recognizes the role
of state conduct in defining and maintaining relationships between states. 190 As
state practice develops into customary international law, it naturally responds to
unforeseen contingencies. Customary international law also promotes self-
reinforcing behavior. Custom acts as a focal point, providing a guide for state be-
havior. As custom develops, path dependence further promotes cooperation. In-
deed, the role of path dependence is particularly significant in the legal setting,
where legal precedent influences both subsequent legal decisions and state action.
Finally, customary international law clarifies state expectations about their re-
spective property rights, further stabilizing state relations. Through this process,
customary international law guides state behavior in the absence of more fonnal
structures. 
1 9 1
187. See Olufemi Elias, The Nature of the Subjective Element in Customary Interna-
tional Law, 44 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 501 (1995); Sm I-hRSCH LAuTERPAcHT, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 379-381 (1958) (dis-
cussing the elements and conditions of opinio necessitatisjuris).
188. JAms, supra note 178, at 42.
189. See generally Michael Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules: Customary
International Law From an Interdisciplinary Perspective, 17 MiH. J. Ir'L L. 109 (1995)
(providing an overview of customary international law and attempting to synthesize the
academic study of international relations vith the discipline of international law); TH
POLmcAL ECONOMY OF CUSToMs AND CuLTuR : INFORmAL SOLUTIONS To THE COMMON
PROBLEM (Terry Anderson & Randy Simmons eds., 1993).
190. Charles Lipson, in an interesting article, examined why some internationid agree-
ments are informal. While his analysis focused on written agreements, his reasons for why
states choose informal agreements rather than formal treaties may also apply to customary
international lav. These include: "(1) the desire to avoid formal and visible pledges, (2)
the desire to avoid [domestic] ratification [requirements], (3) the ability to renegotiate or
modify as circumstances change, [and] (4) the need to reach agreement quickly." Lipson,
supra note 170, at 501.
191. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. The advantages of informal practice
over more formalized agreements has been recognized in various settings. See generally
Ekkehart Schlicht, On Custom, 149 J. INST. & THEOR. EcoN. 178 (1993); GEOROE W.
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Customary international law, however, suffers from some limitations.19 2 It is
unclear at what point state practice becomes customary international law. Because
it is not explicitly codified, there may be problems regarding interpretation and
the scope of obligations. As a result, property rights may not be well specified. It
is also less likely that there will be a formal framework to monitor compliance,
mediate disputes and impose sanctions for rule violations. These limitations can
make customary international law susceptible to violation. They may also give
rise to confrontations if states have conflicting interpretations regarding custom-
ary international law and seek to use practice to affirm their view of the law.
193
The rational design hypothesis provides an interesting framework for review-
ing this description of international law. 194 According to Kenneth Abbott, the ra-
tional design hypothesis "assumes that states act as rational entities pursuing their
national interests as they see them. In situations of interdependence, the theory
suggests, states will, and should, tend to design their international agreements and
institutions to address the particular strategic situations in which they find them-
selves."195 Professor Abbott suggests that the rational design hypothesis has nu-
DowNs & DAVID U. RocKE, TACrrBARGA=nhG, Anis RACES, AND ARNIS CO'rmOL (1990)
(discussing the nature and methods of tacit bargaining and stressing the importance of tacit
bargaining as a crucial means for rescuing and maintaining peace); JoN. ELsmr, THE
CmmTr OF SociErY: A STUDY OF Soci.AL OiRE.R (1989) (discussing social order, including
the concepts of collective action bargaining and social norms).
192. See, e.g., Friedrich Kratochvil, Contract and Regimes: Do Issue Sp-cificity and
Variations of Formality Matter?, in REGIME THEO y A'D ImRmAxO.zAL RELA riS 73,
91 (Volker Rittberger ed., 1995); Phillip P, Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary In-
ternational Law, 33 UCLA L. REv. 665 (1986) (arguing that customary international law
is inherently incompatible with national courts, particularly American courts and American
political philosophy).
193. See, e.g., William J. Aceves, The Freedom of Navigation Program: A Study of the
Relationship Between Law and Politics, 19 HAsTnGS INT'L & Comp. L. REv. 259, 318-21
(1996) (discussing both general and specific examples of using state practice to assert an
interpretation of international law and warning that such methods must ba balanced
against the potential violent ramifications); A&MRiCAN SocmTY OF INTRzATioNAL LAW,
Nozvormc REsPoNsEs To VIO=mmCE-PRO,- PROBLRms: Tim CASES OF DIspurED
MARrTmsm CIAmis AND STATE-SPoNSORED TERRORISM 1-4 (1991) (stating that "the very
importance of the sea makes it a fertile source of dispute between states with conflicting
interests").
194. Abbott, supra note 13, at 1.
195. Id. See also John Setear, Responses to Breach of a Treaty and Rationalist Inter-
national Relations Theory: The Rules of Release and Remediation in the Lav of Traties
and the Law of State Responsibility, 83 VA. L. REv. 1 (1997). The rational design hypothe-
sis is similar to functionalist theory. According to Keohane, a functional theory seeks to
explain particular phenomenon in terms of their effects. 'Rational choice theory, as ap-
plied to social institutions, assumes that institutions can be accounted for by examining the
incentives facing the actors Who created and maintain them. Institutions exist because they
could have reasonably been expected to increase the welfare of their creators." KEomANm,
supra note 45, at 80.
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merous implications for the scientific study of international cooperation. 196
The rational design hypothesis recognizes that both treaty law and customary
international law promote cooperation, albeit in different ways.197 Treaty law es-
tablishes formal and explicit agreements to promote cooperation. Customary in-
ternational law also promotes cooperation, but it does so in the absence of formal
agreements. Despite these differences, both sources of international law contain
mechanisms identified by institutionalist theory that promote cooperation and in-
fluence state behavior. Both treaty and customary international law minimize un-
certainty, promote efficiency and reduce rent-seeking behavior by egoistic states.
These goals are accomplished in the absence of a common government or other
formal governance structures. Thus, international law does not depend on altru-
ism or idealism to influence state behavior. 198 Rather, it functions on the basis of
a conscious choice by states seeking to promote their self-interest. 199 Quite sim-
ply, international law exists because it advances the overall welfare of its crea-
tors.20 0 This is an important discovery for students seeking to affirm the relevance
of international law.
196. Abbott, supra note 13, at 2 (suggesting that scholars can reason backward from
the provision of international agreements and the procedures and institutions they establish
to conclusions about the strategic relationship of the parties to such arrangements). In ad-
dition to its importance for understanding international politics, the rational design hy-
pothesis shows how international lawyers, expert in the interpretation of international
agreements, can contribute to the international relations research agenda. Id.
197. There is some debate regarding the hierarchy of sources in international law. Some
scholars argue that treaty law is superior to customary international law. Others argue that
treaty law and customary international law are equal in status. While this analysis does not
suggest that either treaty law or customary international law should be accorded primacy, it
does suggest the benefits provided by each form of international law. For examples of
these arguments, see JAms, supra note 178, at 10-11; Hiram Chodosh, An Interpretive
Theory of International Law: The Distinction Between Treaty and Customary Law, 28
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 973 (1995); Jonathan I. Chamey, International Agreements and
the Development of Customary International Law, 61 WASH. L. Rv. 971 (1986).
198. See Snidal, supra note 14, at 129; Keohane, supra note 11, at 380.
199. It has been suggested that some elements of international law are not the result of
conscious choice by states. See generally Jonathan I. Charney, The Persistent Objector
Rule and the Development of Customary International Law, 56 BRIT Y.B. IT'L L. I
(1986); Ted Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent
Objector in International Law, 26 HARV. INT'L L. J. 457 (1985); Prosper Weil, Towards
Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413 (1983).
200. This is entirely consistent with the notion that legal systems must ultimately serve
the interests of the actors that function in their ambit. For an analysis of how legal systems
are reactive to the interests of such actors, see generally Symposium: Positive Political
Theory and Public Law, 80 GEo. L. J. 457 (1992); John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, A
Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 12 INT'L R v. L. & ECON. 263 (1992); Mat-
thew McCubbins et al., Positive and Normative Models of Procedural Rights: An Integra-
tive Approach to Administrative Procedures, 6 J. L. EcoN. & ORG. 307 (1990).
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IV. FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY
The recently concluded Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty201 (Treaty) provides
an interesting case study. Institutionalist theory suggests that the Treaty must
contain certain mechanisms to promote cooperation, particularly in the highly
charged realm of nuclear proliferation where the consequences of defection are
significant This final section reviews the Treaty and examines it through the lens
of institutionalist theory.
A. THE COmPuHNswE TEsT BAN TREATY
On January 25, 1994, negotiations began in the Conference on Disarmament
for a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.202 After two years of extensive and
often contentious negotiations, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on September 10, 1996.203 On September 24,
1996 over fifty countries signed the treaty, including China, France, Russia, the
United Kingdom and the United States.204 The Treaty will enter into force 180
days after the date of deposit of the instruments of ratification by all the countries
listed in Annex Two to the Treaty.20 5 The Treaty, however, cannot enter into
force earlier than two years after it was opened for signature.20
6
Article I of the Treaty sets forth the basic obligations of member states. The
parties are prohibited from performing any nuclear weapons tests or allowing any
nuclear explosion to take place within their jurisdiction.20 7 These obligations are
201. Treaty, supra note 15.
202. The Conference on Disarmament is a multilateral forum for negotiating arms con-
trol agreements. It is affiliated with the United Nations and is based in Geneva.
203. The Treaty consists of the main text, two Annexes to the Treaty, a Protocol and the
Annexes to the Protocol. Each of these elements form an integral party of the Treaty.
Treaty, supra note 15, art. X
204. Both India and Pakistan, however, refused to sign the Treaty. Alison Mitchell,
Clinton, at U.N., Signs Treaty Banning All Nuclear Testing, N.Y. TMS, Sept. 25, 1996,
atAl.
205. Treaty, supra note 15, art. XIV(l). Annex 2 lists 44 members of the Conference on
Disarmament with nuclear power or nuclear research reactors.
206. Treaty, supra note 15, art. XIV(l). If the Treaty has not entered into force three
years after the date of its opening for signature, the Secretary-General of the United Na-
tions shall convene a conference of the states that have already deposited their instruments
of ratification if so requested by a majority of those states. Id. The Conference shall con-
sider and decide by consensus what measures may be taken to accelerate the ratification
process in order to facilitate the entry into force of the Treaty.
207. Treaty, supra note 15, art. M(l). Article I11l) further states that "each State Party
undertakes to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any woy participating in the carying
out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion). Article 11(1)
adds, inter alia, that "[e]ach State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional proc-
esses, take any necessary measures to implement its obligations under this Treaty." Id. In
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absolute because the Treaty is not subject to reservations. 208
Article II establishes the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organiza-
tion (Organization), whose "obligations are to achieve the object and purpose of
the Treaty, to ensure the implementation of its provisions, and to provide a forum
for consultation and cooperation among States Parties." 20 9 Three organs are es-
tablished within the Organization: the Conference, the Executive Council and the
Technical Secretariat. 2 10 The Conference is the principal organ of the Organiza-
tion.211 It is composed of all States Parties. It may consider any matter that falls
within the scope of the Treaty and can make recommendations and take decisions
on any such matters. The Conference oversees the activities of the Executive
Council and the Technical Secretariat. 2 12 The Executive Council is the executive
organ of the Organization and is responsible to the Conference.
2 13 It consists of
fifty-one members, which are elected by the Conference. 2 14 Its primary responsi-
bility is to promote the effective implementation of, and compliance with, the
Treaty.2 15 The Technical Secretariat is responsible for assisting the States Parties
in the implementation of the Treaty and ensuring verification of compliance.
216
The Conference appoints a Director-General who acts as administrator of the
Techmical Secretariat.
2 17
Article IV sets forth a verification regime.218 Specifically, it establishes four
mechanisms to promote verification of Treaty obligations: (1) an International
Monitoring System; (2) consultation and clarification procedures; (3) on-site in-
contrast, the Limited Test Ban Treaty prohibited nuclear weapon testing in the atmosphere,
outer space or underwater. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in
the Outer Space and Underwater, signed Aug. 5. 1963, entered into force Oct. 10, 1963, 14
U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43.
208. Treaty, supra note 15, art. XV ("the Article of and the Annexes to this Treaty shall
not be subject to reservations.") Id. The provisions of the Annexes to the Protocol, how-
ever, may be subject to reservations, provided they are not incompatible with the object
and purpose of the Treaty. Id.
209. Treaty, supra note 15, art. II(A)(1) ("The seat of the Organization shall be in Vi-
enna, Austria".). Id. at 11(A)(3).
210. Id. art. 11(4).
211. Treaty, supra note 15, art. 11(B)(24) ([The conference] shall consider any ques-
tions, matters or issues within the scope of this Treaty .... ). Id.
212. Id. art. 1(25).
213. Id. art. 1(37).
214. Id. arts. 11(27),(29).
215. Treaty, supra note 15, art. II(B)(37). ("The Executive Council shall act in confor-
mity with the recommendations, decisions and guidelines of the Conference and ensure
their continuous and proper implementation.").
216. Treaty, supra note 15, art. 11(42). An International Data Centre is established as
part of the Technical Secretariat. Id.
217. Id. art. 1(B)(26)(d).
218. Treaty, supra note 15, art. IV. The Protocol to the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty
describes the respective elements of the verification regime in greater detail.
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spections; and (4) confidence-building measures.219 The International Monitoring
System consists of facilities for seismological monitoring, radionuclide monitor-
ing, hydroacoustic monitoring, infrasound monitoring and respective means of
communication. 220 The International Data Centre which is under the authority of
the Technical Secretariat, supports this systen 221 In addition, consultation and
clarification procedures are available.222 The Treaty urges States Parties to make
every effort to clarify and resolve, among themselves, any matter which may cause
concern about possible non-compliance. 223 A State Party that receives a request
for clarification must provide such information to the requesting party within
forty-eight hours of the initial request,2 24 Extensive procedures concerning on-site
inspections are also provided. 2 25 Each State Party has the right to request an on-
site inspection. 226 "The only purpose of an on-site inspection is to determine
whether a nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion was car-
ried out in violation of the Treaty."227 Requests for on-site inspections are sub-
mitted to the Director-General of the T~chnical Secretariat and must be voted on
by the Executive Committee within ninety-six hours of the initial request 228 Fi-
nally, the treaty establishes confidence-building measures to contribute to the
timely resolution of any compliance concerns arising from possible misinterpreta-
tion of verification data relating to chemical explosions.
229
Article V provides several measures to ensure compliance. Both the Confer-
ence and the Executive Council have the authority to request a State Party to re-
dress a situation raising compliance problems.230 "If the State Party fails to fulfill
the request within the specified time, the Conference may, inter alia, decide to
restrict or suspend the State Party from the exercise of its rights and privileges
under the Treaty."2 31 If non-compliance with the basic obligations of the Treaty
may result in damage to the object and purpose of the Treaty, the Conference may
recommend to the State Parties that collective measures be taken.23 2 Finally, the
219. Treaty, supra note 15, art. IV(A)(1). In addition, the Treaty recognizes that States
Parties may use national technical means for verifying compliance. Id. art. IV(5). National
technical means refers to the use of satellite reconnaissance and other national intelli-
gence-gathering measures that do not violate international law.
220. Treaty, supra note 15, art. IV(16).
221. See supra note 190 and accompanying text. See also Treaty, supra note 15, art.
(18) (stating "[e]ach State Party has the right to participate in the international exchange of
data and to have access to all data made available to the International Data Centre.").
222. Id. art. IV(30).
223. Id. art. IV(29).
224. Id. art. IV(30).
225. Id. arts. IV(34)-(38).
226. Treaty, supra note 15, art. IV(34).
227. Id. art. IV(35).
228. Id. arts. IV(38), (46).
229. Treaty, supra note 15, art. IV(68).
230. Id. art. V(2).
231. Id.
232. Id. art. V(3). The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that a viola-
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Conference or the Executive Council may bring the issue to the attention of the
United Nations.
233
Article VI establishes dispute settlement procedures. It recognizes that disputes
concerning the application or "interpretation of the Treaty must be settled in ac-
cordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaty and in conformity with the
provisions of the U.N. Charter." 234 When disputes arise regarding implementa-
tion or clarification of the Treaty, concerned parties are instructed to negotiate or
use any other amicable means to swiftly settle the dispute.235 The parties can seek
recourse from the appropriate organs of the Treaty or, by agreement, may refer the
matter to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 236 The Treaty provides that the
Executive Council may contribute to the settlement of disputes by whatever means
it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States
Parties to seek a settlement through a process of their own choice, bringing the
matter to the attention of the Conference or recommending a time-limit for any
agreed procedure.237 "In addition, the Conference shall consider questions raised
by States Parties or brought to its attention by the Executive Council. '238 The
Conference may also establish organs with tasks related to dispute settlement.
239
Finally, the Executive Council and the Conference are separately empowered to
request an advisory opinion from the ICJ on any legal question arising from ac-
tivities of the Organization.
240
The Treaty is of unlimited duration.241 Each State Party, however, has the
right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that the Treaty jeopardizes its su-
preme interests.242 Withdrawal requires giving six months advance notice to
tion of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty is
considered a material breach of a treaty. Vienna Convention, supra note 180, art. 60(3).
material breach of a multilateral treaty entitles the other parties, inter alia, to suspend the
operation of the treaty in whole or in part or to terminate the agreement. Collective meas-
ures can include a wide variety of actions including diplomatic, economic or political re-
sponses. In addition, more severe measures are permissible. The RESTATeMeNT (THRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW provides that "a state victim of a violation of an international
obligation by another state may resort to countermeasures that might otherwise be unlaw-
ful, if such measures (a) are necessary to terminate the violation or prevent further viola-
tion, or to remedy the violation; and (b) are not out of proportion to the violation and the
injury suffered." RESTATEMENT (TnIRD) OF Tm FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 905. This provi-
sion is subject to the prohibitions on the threat or use of force in the U.N. Charter.
233. Treaty, supra note 15, art. V(4).
234. Id. art. VI(l).
235. Id. art. VI(2).
236. Id. art. VI(2).
237. Id. art. VI(3).
238. Id. art. VI(4).
239. Treaty, supra note 15, art. VI(4).
240. Id. art. VI(5). This empowerment is subject to the authorization of the United Na-
tions General Assembly. Id.
241. Id. art. IX(l).
242. Id. art. IX(2).
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other States Parties, the Executive Council, the Secretary-General and the United
Nations Security Council.
24 3
B. THE APPLICATION OF INST1TuIONALIST THEORY
Institutionalist theory suggests that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty must
contain certain mechanisms to effectively promote cooperation and reduce the
likelihood of defection by States Parties. These mechanisms can be divided into
three broad categories: procedural mechanisms, verification regime and dispute
resolution.
The procedural mechanisms of the Treaty include the promotion of iteration,
the reduction of transaction costs, the development of self-reinforcing behavior
and the establishment of property rights. The Treaty promotes iteration on several
levels. The Treaty itself is of unlimited duration. While it allows states to with-
draw, such action requires six months advance notice.2 4 In addition, the organs
of the Organization promote iteration through their regular meeting and consul-
tation procedures. Both the Conference and the Executive Council meet on a
regular basis. Furthermore, the Treaty provides for ten year Review Conferences
to examine the operation and effectiveness of the Treaty. Each of these elements
establish the Treaty as a long term obligation and promote regularized patterns of
behavior by States Parties.
The Treaty also reduces transaction costs and promotes self-reinforcing be-
havior. The Organization and its concomitant organs (the Conference, Executive
Council and the Technical Secretariat) coordinate activities under the Treaty. This
framework reduces costs by providing a central organization and administrative
staff. The multilateral verification regime reduces the need for individual states to
monitor compliance. The Treaty also promotes self-reinforcing behavior among
the States Parties. It provides a guide which allows states to coordinate their ac-
tion along the norms and rules set forth in the Treaty and subsequently developed
by the Organization. Finally, the Treaty sets forth the respective rights and obli-
gations of States Parties in explicit terms, which clarifies property rights. Prop-
erty rights remain constant because reservations are not allowed and the dispute
resolution system affirms these rights in the event of a dispute.
The verification regime is perhaps the most significant component of the
Treaty. It gathers and distributes information, promotes transparency, and moni-
tors compliance. To maximize the effectiveness of the verification regime, the
Treaty establishes both multilateral and bilateral mechanisms. The International
Monitoring System provides a multilateral mechanism for monitoring compli-
ance. The Technical Secretariat is responsible for gathering compliance informa-
tion and distributing the information to States Parties. In addition, the verification
regime establishes bilateral mechanisms for monitoring compliance through the
use of consultation and clarification procedures, on-site inspections and confi-
243. Id. art. ]X(3).
244. Id.
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dence building measures as well as authorizing the use of national technical
means to verify compliance.
Finally, the Treaty establishes a two-tiered system for dispute resolution. It rec-
ognizes that disputes may arise with respect to the application or interpretation of
the Treaty. Accordingly, it establishes dispute settlement procedures to address
these situations. States Parties are encouraged to settle their own disputes. They
may also seek recourse from other sources for dispute settlement, including the
organs of the Treaty or the ICJ. In addition, the Treaty authorizes the use of sanc-
tions in the event of a situation that raises problems regarding compliance. Sanc-
tions can include restricting a State Party's rights and privileges under the Treaty.
If damage to the object and purpose of the Treaty may result from non-
compliance, the Conference might recommend the use of collective measures as
long as they are in conformity with international law.
The development of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is entirely consistent
with institutionalist theory. To address their strategic situation, the States Parties
needed to develop a cohesive management structure, a sophisticated verification
regime and an effective dispute resolution system. Each of these mechanisms
promote cooperation and minimize the possibility of defection. Consistent with
institutionalist theory, therefore, the Treaty moves the States Parties away from
the pernicious realm of the Prisoner's Dilemma and towards a system of mutual
cooperation.
V. CONCLUSION
Theories of international relations provide students of international law with a
framework to analyze international affairs. With this framework, students of in-
ternational law can understand more fully the causes of conflict and the paths to
cooperation. Moreover, the interdisciplinary merger of international law and in-
ternational relations provides the basis for developing stronger and more effective
international institutions. This article has identified several elements that can
promote cooperation. The typology presented is not a mere academic exercise,
however. Indeed, these findings provide a powerful tool when combined with the
practical experience of legal scholars and practitioners. In this respect, this article
serves a prescriptive role, urging students to recognize the benefits of interdisci-
plinary research, not just in theory, but in practice as well.245
245. For a discussion on the separation of the academic and practical worlds, see David
Newsom, Foreign Policy and Academia, 101 FOREIGN POLICY 52 (Winter 1995-96); Two
WoRLDs OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Christopher Hill & Pamela Beshoff eds., 1994).
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